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Article
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE
OF LAW IN THE CLOUD
DAMON C. ANDREWS *
JOHN M. NEWMAN †
ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has revolutionized how society interacts with,
and via, technology. Though some early detractors criticized the
“cloud” as being nothing more than an empty industry buzzword,
we contend that by dovetailing communications and calculating
processes for the first time in history, cloud computing is—both
practically and legally—a shift in prevailing paradigms. As a
practical matter, the cloud brings with it a previously undreamtof sense of location independence for both suppliers and consumers. And legally, the shift toward deploying computing ability as
a service, rather than as a product, represents an evolution to a
contractual foundation for interacting.
Already, substantive cloud-based disputes have erupted in a variety of legal fields, including personal privacy, intellectual property, and antitrust, to name a few. Yet before courts can confront
such issues, they must first address the two fundamental procedural questions of a lawsuit that form the bases of this Article—
whether any law applies in the cloud, and, if so, which law ought
to apply. Drawing upon novel analyses of analogous Internet jurisprudence, as well as concepts borrowed from disciplines ranging from economics to anthropology, this Article seeks to supply
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answers to these questions. To do so, we first identify a set of
normative goals that jurisdictional and choice-of-law methodologies ought to achieve in the unique context of cloud computing.
With these goals in mind, we then lay out structured analytical
guidelines and suggested policy reforms to guide the continued
development of jurisdiction and choice of law in the cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
[A] time may come, and may not be far distant, when commercial
aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be unrealistic to
consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United
States or of any particular State while flying at such altitudes. 1
We have come a long way in the more than half-century since Grace v.
MacArthur was decided. Today, in record-setting fashion, even humans are
surpassing commercial aircraft in altitude.2 And with the ever-increasing
use of cellular and wireless technologies, data is now, more than ever, being
sent through and stored in the airwaves—or clouds. 3 A different type of
“cloud,” however, has taken center stage in this new era of data transfer and
storage: cloud computing. Although a healthy debate surrounds its precise
definition, 4 cloud computing, put simply, is the ability of an end user to
store and access remotely located files and services over a network by
means of a smart phone, computer, tablet, or other networked device.5
The advent of cloud computing brought with it myriad novel legal
challenges pertaining to, inter alia, privacy concerns, intellectual property

1. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
2. On October 14, 2012, Austrian Felix Baumgartner freefell 128,100 feet—more than
twenty-four miles—to Earth from a space capsule. John Tierney, 24 Miles, 4 Minutes and 834
M.P.H., All in One Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/felix-baumgartner-skydiving.html?_r=0. The stunt was
part of the Red Bull Stratos project to gather new data about the human body and test new materials at extreme altitudes. Id. On his descent, Baumgartner achieved a maximum speed of 833.9
miles per hour, or Mach 1.24. Id.
3. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Allocating Radio Spectrum for the “Mobile Data Tsunami,” 13
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 82, 82–84 (2012) (noting the “looming spectrum
shortage” and spectrum “crowding” due to the proliferation of wireless data).
4. As one commentator noted humorously, “[a]ttempting to define cloud computing can
prove to be as elusive as attempting to capture a genuine cloud with one’s hands.” David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (ANNUAL REVIEW) 621, 638 (2010); see also infra notes 54–55 and
accompanying text (discussing the public’s misconceptions about cloud computing).
5. William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2010). For a more detailed explanation of
the origins and mechanics of cloud computing, see infra Part II.C.
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rights, and antitrust violations. 6 And as is common with new technologies,
the continuing scientific development of cloud computing is outpacing its
legal counterpart, at least for now.7 But as courts’ decisions regarding the
substantive law of cloud computing attempt to keep stride with the underlying technology, 8 critical procedural questions can sometimes be overlooked. 9 This Article grapples with the two fundamental questions of procedure—where personal jurisdiction is proper and what law governs a
dispute—and endeavors to provide structured frameworks for analyzing
them. The answer to these questions can oftentimes exert an even greater
influence over a lawsuit’s outcome than its substantive merits,10 for equally
as important as what the law says is which law applies, and where it does
so. 11
To illustrate the intersection of cloud technology and the law, imagine
a manmade floating island, anchored at sea or in a river, upon which computer servers are aggregated. The buoyant structure can be moved about the
body of water as needed—for example, to provide computer and telecommunications support to an area affected by a natural disaster—and the servers are powered and cooled by the motion (wave, tidal, or current) of the
water in which the structure floats. Too futuristic or unrealistic? Not for

6. See infra notes 81–83 (providing examples of cases in which cloud-based computing issues were litigated).
7. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 566 (1998) (“[T]hat technological developments outpace the rate of legal change poses another particular problem for intellectual property rights; the
law always lags behind the technology.”); see also Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1318 (2002) (“The Internet is fast developing and continues to outpace the law.”).
8. See Lee, supra note 7, at 1318 (describing the challenges courts confront in resolving
cases presenting issues with regard to cyberspace).
9. See Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An
Interdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 106 (2008)
(“Certainly, when intellectual property disputes touch on other disciplines, such as civil procedure . . . courts have tended to overlook their synergies, focusing instead on only one of several
important policies or principles. The result has gone beyond missed opportunities. It has led to
judicial mistakes . . . .”).
10. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 745 & n.130 (2009) (“Which state’s law applies can determine the litigation outcome.”).
11. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice-of-Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 992–93 (1994) (“[C]ourts recognize that procedural requirements perform an essential
function in any legal system . . . . Hence, substance is not all; courts and administrators recognize
that substantive results must be balanced against the harm to the system that would result if procedures were entirely ignored.”).
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technology behemoth Google, Inc., which was granted a patent for such a
data center in 2009. 12
In industry terms, Google’s patent describes a mobile, marine-based
server farm. 13 The advantages of such a server farm include, among others,
a zero-cost power supply and the ability to move the servers within close
proximity of the end users who interact with them. 14 In addition to these
economic and functional considerations, however, there are substantial legal
consequences to this arrangement. For example, a server farm that is located both everywhere and nowhere, essentially, 15 allows users to conduct
network activities that might otherwise be regulated heavily—or even prohibited—by the national laws of the country where a land-based server is
located. 16
Query, then, if a lawsuit were to arise based on content hosted by a
marine-based server like the one described in Google’s patent, where would
jurisdiction be proper? In Delaware, where Google is incorporated? In
California, where Google has its principal place of business? Or elsewhere? And equally as important, if a court can hear the case, what law
governs? To the extent that these questions remain unanswered, they are
especially troubling because cloud-computing service providers often retain
copies of uploaded content in multiple locations or, at the opposite end of
spectrum, fragment data across numerous servers. 17
This Article seeks to answer these questions. Part II traces the history
of data storage and data transfer prior to the dawn of cloud computing, with
particular emphases on content reproduction, communication technology,

12. Water-Based Data Center, U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr.
28, 2009); Ashlee Vance, Google’s Search Goes Out to Sea, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 7,
2008, 9:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/googles-search-goes-out-to-sea/.
13. See Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International
Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 714 (2011) (“[A] server is a computer designed to provide information or processes to other computers on a network, and a server farm, also known as a data center, is a group of servers in one location connected by a network.”).
14. See id. at 716–17.
15. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997)
(“The Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is
concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.”).
16. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 718 (noting, in particular, that “[g]ambling or pornography websites could . . . escape scrutiny by running floating sites” and highlighting some countries’
laws that ban certain Internet activities).
17. Josiah Dykstra & Damien Riehl, Forensic Collection of Evidence from Infrastructure-asa-Service Cloud Computing, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2012).
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and computing capability; 18 it also provides a technological overview of
cloud computing and the legal contours in which it exists.19 Part III then
summarizes personal-jurisdiction and choice-of-law jurisprudence. 20 Part
III also sets forth the normative goals that this Article seeks to achieve by
evaluating the interplay between predictability and innovation and discussing the economic impacts of new technologies. 21
Parts IV and V then lay out frameworks for analyzing personal jurisdiction and choice of law in cloud-computing cases. These Parts each begin
by examining decisions from Internet-era cases and demonstrating that
cloud computing presents issues of personal jurisdiction and choice of law
that are distinct from cases involving regular Internet interactions, that is,
operating or accessing a website.22 By recognizing this contrast, Parts IV
and V explain the reasons why the Internet-law approach to personal jurisdiction and choice of law is not only legally incongruous with cloud computing, but also unworkable in practice. Parts IV and V then offer a series
of solutions—both judicial and legislative—for addressing these cloudcomputing conundrums in personal jurisdiction and choice of law.23
Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion. In sum, this Article exposes
the hazards of attempting to apply traditional personal-jurisdiction and
choice-of-law doctrines to novel situations that arise in cloud-computing
interactions. By acknowledging the need to depart from these conventional
frameworks, this Article offers solutions that accommodate the recent developments in technology and illuminate a path for courts and legislatures
to follow when addressing the intricacies raised by these two fundamental
procedural questions.
II. FROM COURIER TO CLOUD: THE EVOLUTION AND CONVERGENCE OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTING
The central thesis of what follows is simple. Prior to the advent of
cloud computing, humankind’s ability to communicate and to calculate (and
later to compute) developed on separate tracks. The shift to the cloud is the
bridging of that millennia-old gap. In short, cloud computing constitutes
the first dovetailing of communication and calculation. Thus, we contend

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part II.A–B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.A–B.
See infra Part III.B.4.
See infra Parts IV.A, V.A.
See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.
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that the advent of cloud computing represents a true paradigm shift 24 in the
way that both suppliers and consumers interact with digital technology—it
is a shift away from viewing computing capability as a product and toward
deploying and consuming it as a service.
As with any disruptive leap forward in technology that ultimately alters real-space behavior, the move to the cloud carries with it implications
for the administration of legal systems and the application of existing
laws. 25 The first step toward exploring those implications is gaining an understanding of the technology itself; accordingly, this Part begins by recounting the developments in information technology that paved the way
for cloud computing. We turn first to what we term the “Pre-Network
Era”—a period that spans the roughly seven-and-a-half millennia predating
the rise of the Internet.
A. The Pre-Network Era
The marketplace transactions, political structures, and legal mechanisms of ancient civilizations eventually grew too complex to manage using
only human memory and oral communication. Innovations provided the
means to overcome these limitations—as to communicative data storage
and transfer, writing emerged; as to calculating ability, the abacus was developed. Yet, from the earliest symbols etched into clay pottery or cave
walls 26 to the first books printed more than six millennia later using Gutenberg’s movable-type printing press 27 to the millions of copies of massmarket hardcover and paperback books still being printed today, content
storage and transfer occurred within remarkably static structures. Communication technology also marginally improved but, overall, remained fairly

24. The term “paradigm shift” originated in Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn employed it to describe a dramatic change in the prevailing theory
underlying a field of scientific study. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 84–85 (2d ed. 1970). It has subsequently entered the popular lexicon as a phrase
more loosely describing any major change in political, social, artistic, or commercial structures,
and it is in this latter sense that we use the term here.
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26. See David Whitehouse, ‘Earliest Writing’ Found, BBCNEWS (May 4, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/334517.stm (“The first known examples of writing may
have been unearthed at an archaeological dig in Pakistan. . . . [T]hese primitive inscriptions found
on pottery may pre-date all other known writing.”).
27. This press, it should be noted, may or may not have been the first movable-type press,
and those “first books” may or may not have been Bibles—a healthy historical debate surrounds
such claims, thankfully one far beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., PETER L.
SHILLINGSBURG, FROM GUTENBERG TO GOOGLE: ELECTRONIC REPRESENTATIONS OF LITERARY
TEXTS 28 (2006).
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static. Similarly, calculating (and later computing) remained—in at least
some ways—a relatively stable technology from 2000 B.C. to the late twentieth century.
As to content, the most readily apparent counterargument to our thesis
is that the Gutenberg Press radically changed reproduction, distribution, and
consumption. It is certainly true that by greatly reducing variable costs, the
invention of the printing press dramatically altered the economics of textual
production. 28 Thus, where “there were perhaps 30,000 books in all of Europe before Gutenberg printed his Bible; less than 50 years later, there were
as many as 10 to 12 million books.” 29 But even as it evolved from scratching in clay pots to using quill pens and vellum to printing multiple sheets
from a single page of movable type, authorship and reproduction throughout most of human history consisted of physically fixing data in “a tangible
medium of expression,” to borrow a phrase from modern U.S. copyright
law. 30 And “tangible” meant media that were physical. The movable-type
press made books inexpensive to reproduce, but it did not eliminate conditions of scarcity. 31 It allowed a single operator to create hundreds of copies
of texts, but it did not change the localized, physical nature of
(re)production. 32 It made printed materials more affordable, but did nothing
transformative to distribution; that is, the end products still had to travel via
the exact same real-space channels as handmade copies. 33 Finally, end users consumed and stored data produced by the Gutenberg Press just as they
had for thousands of years; the only difference was that exponentially more
of them were able to do so.
Even the digitization of content in the twentieth century did not, by itself, bring much structural change to production, distribution, and consumption. Before digital computers were networked, their ability to produce
thousands of perfect copies at marginal costs approaching zero was super-

28. See Jeremiah Dittmar, Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the
Printing Press, 126 Q. J. ECON. 1133, 1140 (2011) (comparing the benefits derived from the invention of the printing press in cities with and without printing presses).
29. Gutenberg’s Legacy, HARRY RANSOM CTR., UNIV. OF TEX.,
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/educator/modules/gutenberg/books/legacy/ (last visited May 30, 2013).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
31. See Dittmar, supra note 28, at 1140 (describing the limitations to obtaining print media in
cities that did not have printing presses).
32. See id. (explaining that “[p]rint media were costly to transport because they were heavy
and fragile commodities”).
33. See LUCIAN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK 115–17 (Geoffrey Nowel-Smith & David Wootton, eds., 1976) (discussing the importance to early publishers of
being located along established trade routes).
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fluous. 34 An individual in her own home could produce localized copies of
content, but had no use for the surplus. 35 This was so because distribution—as it had been following the introduction of the Gutenberg Press—
remained largely unchanged. And as a result, consumption structures and
processes remained relatively static as well.
A somewhat stronger counterargument could be made as to communications technology. Here, the focal points would likely be the emergence of
pre-digital networks like the telegraph or analog telephone systems or, alternatively, the development of wireless broadcast (or wired narrowcast)
systems. By alleviating at least some of the geographic–locality limitations
on human communications, these developments were indeed innovative. 36
Yet again, we argue that these were—as a structural matter—less revolutionary than they might seem at first glance. These systems were beset by
one of the same fundamental problems as face-to-face communication: engaging in two- or multiple-way communications dictated a relatively limited number of participants; as that number expanded, communication necessarily became one-way. 37 Put another way, in a real-space, localized
setting, a multiple-way conversation can only occur between a very limited
number of participants. Expanding this number soon requires changing the
format to a one-way communication from an active speaker to a passive audience. And the advent of telegraphs, telephones, and wireless broadcast
radio and television did nothing to change that.
As to computing, our claim that the digital computer in some ways
represented little change from the abacus might seem downright heretical.38
Admittedly, the digital computer has represented a quantum leap forward in
calculating ability—and the subsequent exponential growth in processing

34. See John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138409 (“The intangibility of code, coupled with years of exponential
growth in processing speeds and hard drive capacity, allowed for nearly instantaneous, highquality copying that entailed marginal costs approaching zero.”).
35. Id. at 11–12.
36. See generally Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the
Future of National Power, 2 INNOVATIONS 27 (2007) (discussing the interplay between innovation and geography).
37. See id.
38. Cf., e.g., Rocco L. Martino, Innovation and Economic Growth: Lessons from the Story of
ENIAC, FOOTNOTES (Foreign Policy Research Institute), Apr. 2009, at 1, available at
https://www.fpri.org/docs/FN1406-martino-eniac.pdf (describing the advent of the “Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer” as a symbol of “radical, incremental, and revolutionary innovations . . . the grandfather of the computer and of the information transformation of our
world”).
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capability shows no signs of slowing. 39 But, until very recently, humans
interacted with computing devices much as they had with earlier calculators. Computing was a localized process—a user needed to physically and
locally interact with the machine that would perform the processes she input. 40 And consumers of computing power generally were required to purchase physical machines. In short, computing was viewed as a product, rather than a service. All of this meant that digital computers were
structurally quite similar to pre-digital calculating devices.
Certainly, the advances mentioned above that emerged during the PreNetwork Era brought with them great upheavals in social, economic, political, and legal processes. They were disruptive innovations in every sense
of the word; they wreaked the sort of “creative destruction” upon entrenched markets that Schumpeter famously identified.41 But in recent decades, we have been—and are currently—experiencing paradigm shifts in
content economics, communications technology, and computing capability
that rival in magnitude the sum of innovative activity from the last sevenand-a-half millenia combined.
B. The Internet: A Network of Networks
The Internet—a “network of networks” and the “printing press of the
technology era” 42—provided the communication platform upon which content digitization and increasing computing capability could interact in a truly revolutionary way. Widespread access to the Internet at constantly increasing speeds did to data distribution what digitization and access to
personal computers had done to reproduction: it lowered marginal costs to

39. “Moore’s Law” was coined to describe the rapid pace of growth in processing capability
over
the
previous
two
decades.
INTEL,
MOORE’S
LAW
(2005),
ftp://download.intel.com/sites/channel/museum/Moores_Law/Printed_Materials/Moores_Law_2p
g.pdf (“Nearly 40 years ago, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore forecasted the rapid pace of technology innovation.”).
40. See David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure 3.0?, 17 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 190, 209 (2012) (“[A] user of traditional word-processing software such as Word or
an email application such as Outlook runs these programs off her own machine, using local processing power and data storage facilities.”).
41. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Harper &
Row 3d ed. 1950) (1942) (describing innovations that “incessantly revolutionize[] the economic
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”).
42. Joshua C. Ramo & David S. Jackson, Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 56, 63
(quoting James Barksdale, President and CEO of Netscape).
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essentially zero. 43 The importance of the dawn of the Network Era for content, communication, and now computing, cannot be overstated.44
Without connectivity, advances in computing were fairly irrelevant to
the structural processes in place for the production, distribution, and consumption of communicative content. Before the Network Era, a single end
user could feasibly have created millions of copies of an ebook on her home
computer, but the duplicates would have been relegated to isolated storage
as wasted surplusage. 45 Firms and individuals were able to create content
digitally—for example, newspaper reporters were able to write articles using word-processing programs—but distribution either required slow, costly
physical means or was shackled by the limitations of broad- or narrowcasting discussed above. 46
But networking not only represented a drastic reduction in the costs of
communication, it also eliminated the relevance of geographic location to
distribution capability and costs. By removing the physical element from
reproduction and distribution, it upended the old localized model such that
content could be made available to anyone, anywhere, and could be distributed to them at the speed of light. 47 For the first time, not only ideas themselves, but now their embodiments as well, were truly nonrivalrous. Content abundance replaced content scarcity. 48
Finally, the adoption of the Internet deconstructed the hierarchy of
production. In place of top-down models arose end-to-end architecture that
rendered the traditional concept of “end users” an oxymoron. 49 Former

43. Cf. John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 681, 694 (2012) (“Digital products can be reproduced extremely cheaply, often with
marginal costs approaching zero.”).
44. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 67, 68 (2010) (“The Internet unquestionably represents one of the most important technological developments in recent history. It has revolutionized the way people communicate with one
another and obtain information and has created an unimaginable variety of commercial and leisure
activities.”).
45. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying note 37.
47. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1074–75 (2008) (highlighting the legal challenges resulting from globalization, which
include “the complexities of gathering intelligence from telephone and internet communications
transmitted in and out of the United States and around the world at the speed of light”).
48. See Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media
Networks, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 153 (2010) (referring to “the world of content abundance”).
49. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 8 (2004).
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pure consumers became producers and distributors as well.50 And the rise
of nearly instantaneous, zero-cost, two-way transfer of media created an avenue and demand for multipath, large-scale communication.51 The ability
to effectively converse with thousands of individuals allowed previously
undreamt-of communicative possibilities. A single person’s blog posting
could create a conversation that spread throughout a network of networks,
seemingly with a life of its own—as the neologism aptly puts it, “virally.”
The transformative shift to the Network Era has not been an easy one.
In its infant stages, legal and political battles erupted over the application of
standing laws and norms to the human interactions occurring atop this new
platform. 52 Myriad questions regarding ownership, agreements, morality,
intellectual property, privacy, and other issues remain unresolved. 53 And
the next stage of development, described below, will raise yet even more
questions in need of answers.
C. Rising into the Cloud
The American public remains largely ignorant as to what, exactly,
“cloud computing” is. A majority, in fact, appear to believe it has something to do with actual clouds and that, consequently, a severe squall or
thunderstorm could fatally disrupt cloud-computing processes. 54 Given the
difficulty that even industry experts have in formulating a precise definition

50. See Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2012)
(“Web 2.0 was defined as an ‘amalgam of ‘participatory Web’ applications,’ which turned erstwhile passive end users into active producers by allowing them to generate and share content of
all types.”).
51. Id. at 141–42 (explaining that the “decentralization of the Web . . . empowered the Internet to operate as a platform rather than a mere data conduit,” leading to the advent of widespread
sharing services such as “blogs, wikis, [and other social media websites]”).
52. See, e.g., Bryce A. Lenox, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the
Stream of Commerce Dog New Internet Tricks: Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996), 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 332 (1997) ( “Because of the youth and novelty of the
Internet, jurisdictional issues are only now beginning to surface in the courts.”).
53. Cf., e.g., Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 200, 204 (2009) (discussing how, in particular, “modernity has induced transformations even in seemingly traditional applications of contract law”). But see Lenox, supra note
52, at 331–32 (stating that some “cyber-issues,” including “pornography on the Internet, copyright
law, and libel have been addressed in great detail”).
54. Zach Walton, Americans Think Cloud Computing Comes from Actual Clouds,
WEBPRONEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/americans-think-cloud-computingcomes-from-actual-clouds-2012-08 (discussing the results of a survey of 1,000 Americans which
showed that “51 percent of respondents believe[d] that stormy weather [could] interfere with
cloud computing” and only “16 percent actually knew what the cloud was”).

324

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:313

of “cloud computing,” 55 this confusion is understandable. Yet the fact is
that the majority of computer and smartphone users already consume cloud
services on a daily (even hourly) basis. 56 Web-based email, calendars,
spreadsheet editors, and word-processing programs like the current offerings from Google, Microsoft, and others are all examples of cloudcomputing services already in common use. 57 Without knowing what the
term denotes, it seems, society has already begun rising into the cloud.
Jurisprudence, however, does not have that luxury. Before courts can
adjudicate disputes that arise in the cloud, they must understand what cloud
computing is, how it differs from previous architectures, and what implications those differences carry for jurisdiction and choice of law.
More than a few skeptics have posited that “cloud computing” is nothing more than a redundant buzzword, synonymous and coextensive with the
Internet. 58 It is our aim in the following Part not only to provide a highlevel understanding of the evolution and structure of cloud-computing processes, but also to reply to such skepticism. Cloud services exhibit unique
technological and legal features that will require specialized analyses. In
short, cloud computing—though it shares some similarities with, and frequently leverages the communicative capabilities of, the Internet—is not an
empty concept.
1. Technological Structure
The most commonly cited description of cloud computing is the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) definition: “a
model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources . . . that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service pro-

55. See, e.g., Miranda Mowbray, The Fog over the Grimpen Mire: Cloud Computing and the
Law, 6 SCRIPTED 133, 134 (2009) (“[T]here is no agreed upon definition of cloud computing.”);
Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—Whatever That May
Mean, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123802623665542725.html (“While almost everybody in the tech industry seems to have a
cloud-themed project, few agree on the term’s definition.”).
56. See Walton, supra note 54 (describing survey results revealing that ninety-five percent of
the respondents used cloud-based services daily).
57. See Lametti, supra note 40, at 209 (identifying Google Docs, Microsoft Office Live, and
Gmail as “Cloud-based application[s]”).
58. See, e.g., Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory Limitation on Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240, 244 (2011) (“There is no consensus on the definition of ‘Web 2.0’ or
even that it is anything more than a buzzword.”).
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vider interaction.” 59 Put another way, cloud computing is a model that allows for on-demand “scalability” of computing power by end users that are
located remotely from the computing resources themselves. 60 The NIST
definition goes on to list five attributes of cloud computing: (1) on-demand
self-service, (2) broad network access, (3) resource pooling, (4) rapid elasticity or expansion, and (5) measured service.61 Essentially, cloud-service
providers make a pool of servers available to distributed end users who can
rapidly harness those servers’ collective computing power when needed
(“scaling up”), then rapidly release that power when the desired task is
completed (“scaling down”). 62
Cloud computing also allows “workload migration”—service providers can easily shift workloads across servers, both inside local data centers
and among disparately located data centers. 63 And this, in turn, allows suppliers to route around any single server (or, frequently, even an entire data
center) in case of technical failure, to allow for scheduled maintenance, or
even to avoid consuming expensive peak-demand power in a certain geographic region. 64 This resiliency and flexibility offers readily apparent advantages over traditional computing models for both producers and consumers.
The move to the cloud is a move away from consuming computing resources as a product and toward viewing computing as a service.65 From
the consumer’s perspective, cloud services generally eliminate the geographic location of hardware (other than the consumer’s own thin-client

59. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NIST, SP 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD
COMPUTING 2 (2011).
60. See, e.g., Cindy Pham, Note, E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What’s a Litigant to Do?, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 139, 142 (2013) (“[C]loud computing is an Internet-based service
which provides users access to software, resources, and information stored elsewhere and managed by someone else, anytime and anywhere.”).
61. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2.
62. See Pham, supra note 60, at 139–40 (“[C]loud computing . . . can be scaled to individual
needs.”).
63. T. Sridhar, Cloud Computing—A Primer: Part 1: Models and Technologies, 12
INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2, 3 (2009) (defining “[w]orkload movement” by cloud-computing providers as “migrat[ing] workloads across servers—both inside the data center and across data centers”).
64. See, e.g., Xuan Li & Jine-Chung Lo, Pricing and Peak Aware Scheduling Algorithm for
Cloud Computing, 2012 IEEE 1 (2012).
65. Accordingly, “[c]loud computing involves shifting the bulk of the costs from capital expenditures . . . to an operating expense . . . model, where you pay for usage of these types of resources.” Sridhar, supra note 63, at 3.
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hardware 66) as a relevant aspect of computing. So long as a network connection exists, the physical location of end users, servers, and service providers—and their proximity to one another—is almost entirely irrelevant (at
least outside a courtroom). A U.S. citizen could, for example, use a
smartphone to check her email from La Guardia airport in New York, edit a
document from a desktop computer at a kiosk during a layover in Reykjavik, Iceland, and then schedule a calendar appointment using her laptop
from a hotel in Vienna, Austria. And regardless of her physical location,
the actual computations she was directing could have been occurring on a
server located anywhere on Earth. As the NIST definition puts it, “[t]here
is a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has no
control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources.”67
Indeed, the term “location independence” has been used elsewhere with
some frequency to describe the phenomenon of the geographic irrelevance
of computing resources in the cloud. 68
From the supplier’s perspective, cloud computing’s exact effect on the
relevance of server location varies depending on each supplier’s particular
practices. Take, for example, Google’s email service. Because Google actually owns its massive server farms, it can affirmatively choose to migrate
workloads among its own servers from state to state, country to country, or
even land to sea—in the case of offshore servers—to realize gains from
whatever comparative advantages can be had in the new location. To the
extent Google does so, geographic location of servers remains relevant (at
least to Google, if not to consumers or advertisers) because, in this scenario,
Google has made affirmative, purposeful choices regarding the geographic
location of the server farms handling workloads. By way of contrast, consider a firm offering a competing service that runs over metered service
66. The term “thin client” refers to the advent, made possible by cloud technologies, of enduser devices with relatively little local computing capacity. See, e.g., Lametti, supra note 40, at
219 (“We are entering a period where ‘thin clients’ are becoming the norm. These are devices
with little computing capacity or need to perform computing functions on their own.”). A
smartphone, for example, may have far less computing ability than a laptop or desktop computer—yet, by virtue of Internet connectivity and cloud services, an end-user with a smartphone can
now harness far greater computing and storage capacity than a peer using an unconnected desktop
computer.
67. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2. As the NIST noted, of course, customers still
“may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (for example, country, state, or
datacenter).” Id.
68. See, e.g., Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analysis of the
Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, Queen Mary University of London, School
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 63/2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), at 5 (“Location independence
means, from the customer’s perspective, that the services can be accessed from anywhere with
suitable communications links.”).
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purchased from Amazon’s cloud-services arm. Here, the service provider
may—like its consumers—be indifferent as to the geographic location of
the actual computing power Amazon is providing. Alternatively, cloudservices contracts sometimes specify a large geographic zone encompassing
multiple server farms within which migration can occur. 69 To the extent
that some real-space limitations are contemplated, geographic location of
servers thus can remain salient to varying degrees.
Regardless of the exact circumstances, the importance to service providers of computers’ actual geographic location is—from a technological
standpoint—relatively minimal. This is so because, at its core, cloud computing consists of offering computing resources “that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” 70 If this were not the case, many of the efficiencies offered by
cloud services would disappear. Location independence is an important—
even crucial—aspect of cloud computing for providers as well as customers. 71
2. Legal Structure
From a legal perspective, the cloud embodies a new template for interactions: all interactions in the cloud—unlike those that occur purely via the
Internet—are contract-based. Previously, a consumer who purchased a
computer had little or no ongoing contractual relationship with the supplier.
When computing was a product, consumers purchased and consumed it locally like any other off-the-shelf good. Similarly, visiting a passive Web
1.0-type website generally does not trigger any ongoing contractual relationship. 72 Computing as a service, however, is an entirely different matter.
Like any contract for services, the provision and consumption of cloudcomputing services contemplates a contractual relationship that continues
as long as the service is being provided. 73 Consider, for example, an individual consumer using a cloud-based word-processing application. For as

69. See id. at 28 (noting that “[s]ome major cloud providers . . . have made a point of offering
‘regional zones’ in which a customer may be assured that data will remain”).
70. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2 (emphasis added).
71. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 (“Location independence is also an important
factor for providers, who may seek to deploy their infrastructure wherever it is most convenient
and efficient, and in a manner that maximises the economies of scale already mentioned.”).
72. See Lev-Aretz, supra note 50, at 141 (“Under the Web 1.0 stage, the Web functioned as a
read-only medium through numerous ‘static’ websites.”).
73. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 15–16 (surveying terms and conditions contracts for
cloud services and concluding that “[i]t is not unusual to see a provision that the contract will continue indefinitely until it is terminated”).
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long as she utilizes the application, that consumer is interacting with a supplier under the terms of a contract—a contract for the performance of services—in a way that an individual visiting a passive Web 1.0 website is not.
3. Welfare Gains from Cloud Adoption
It nearly goes without saying that scalability in computing provides
multiple benefits to suppliers and consumers, increasing both total and consumer welfare. Greater resiliency and location independence represent increases in computing quality relative to pre-cloud products. Cost and price
advantages are present as well. On the demand side, consumers of computing services generally exhibit variable demand; that is, they require different amounts of computing power at different times. 74 Yet consumers who
opt to use cloud-computing services can purchase only the computing services they actually use, instead of being forced to purchase enough capacity
to meet maximum demand. 75 Relatedly, shifting computing purchases to
the cloud allows customers to transform the outlays incurred from capital
expenditures, which are front-loaded, to operating expenditures, which are
more evenly distributed. 76 On the supply side, providers of cloud services
can attain economies of scale “by sharing resources between a pool of customers and buying infrastructure in bulk.” 77 These reduced costs, assuming
that the provider is operating in a competitive market, may then be passed
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.78
4. Legal Implications
The shift to cloud computing, like any other major technological upheaval, has not been—and will not be—entirely free of legal obstacles.
Cloud-computing models have been rapidly adopted by providers and us-

74. Id. at 5.
75. Mowbray, supra note 55, at 145–46 (“For buyers, one advantage of using cloud computing, as opposed to buying all the hardware and software necessary to meet their computing needs,
is that they only need to pay for the computing services that they actually use.”).
76. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 3 (describing the transformation of capital expenditures to operating expenditures).
77. Id. It should be noted that, as to a private cloud (owned and operated internally by one
firm), the “pool-of-customers” advantage does not apply.
78. See Lametti, supra note 40, at 213 (“The resource pooling that is possible using cloud
technology means lower overall costs (through lowered costs for the provider, who then offers
services at lower costs to users) . . . .”). Alternatively, if the provider has already opted to offer
services at zero price, the savings might be passed along in other ways, including displaying fewer
advertisements to users (thereby lowering users’ attention costs incurred in using the service) or a
less-intrusive data-usage policy.
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ers, 79 a transition spurred on by the efficiencies noted above. 80 These benefits have not come without a price, however. Sprawling legal disputes have
already arisen out of cloud-based interactions in substantive areas ranging
from personal privacy, 81 to copyright infringement, 82 to antitrust, 83 and
myriad more. Before these issues can be properly adjudicated, however,
courts must address the two fundamental threshold procedural questions
addressed by this Article: jurisdiction and choice of law.
Though the ramifications of procedural decision making in these areas
will indeed be far reaching within the context of the cloud, it is also critical
to recognize their importance for future developments. Just as the law of
the Internet can provide a guidepost for analyzing legal issues related to
cloud computing, so too will cloud-computing decisions provide the bedrock upon which the law for yet-to-be-developed technologies will be
built. 84 The significance of the decisions being made now and in the near
future cannot be overstated.

79. See Mowbray, supra note 55, at 2 (“Cloud computing is part of a general architectural
trend in the computer industry, moving from users doing computing on their own hardware using
copies of software that they own, to users doing computing on other peoples’ machines somewhere in the cloud, using software that they rent.”).
80. See supra Part II.C.1 & 3.
81. In the civil context, see, for example, In re iPhone Application Litigation, 844 F. Supp.
2d 1040, 1057–59 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the type of end-user device is relevant to the level of protection afforded to data stored in the cloud), and Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc., 817 F. Supp.
2d 1090, 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (determining that unopened emails are subject to the protections of
the Stored Communications Act). In the criminal context, see In re United States’ Application for
a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Electronic Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1144–45 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (denying application for search warrant based on its “boundless” scope due to the interconnectedness of digital devices), and In re Application of the United
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845–46 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (denying requests for disclosure of location data for cell phones on Fourth Amendment grounds).
82. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that storing copyrighted television programs on proprietary servers and delivering
them via a closed-circuit network to consumers constituted copyright infringement).
83. The FTC recently announced—though it ultimately abandoned—an investigation into
possible anticompetitive behavior by Google, Inc. Steve Lohr, F.T.C. Said to Prepare for Lawsuit
TIMES,
Oct.
12,
2012,
at
B1,
available
at
vs.
Google,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/ftc-staff-prepares-antitrust-case-against-googleover-search.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The gravamen of the investigation was Google’s possible manipulation of results delivered by its dominant search engine so as to favor internal cloudbased software services like Google Maps, to the detriment of competing services like MapQuest.
Id.
84. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2219
(2009) (“Courts often address new technologies by analogizing to older technologies, in the same
way novel legal theories generally find their proper footing by analogy to precedent.”)
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III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Both jurisdiction and choice of law enjoy rich historical backgrounds.
Principles of constitutional federalism have allowed states to construct varied approaches to these issues that span wide and diverse continua.85 Accordingly, while there are certain prevailing theories that have risen to
prominence and gained solid footing in the law—especially in choice-oflaw jurisprudence—examining the various philosophies underlying these
critical threshold issues is essential to provide context for our proposed solutions to the cloud-computing conundrums. The Parts below review the
maturation of personal-jurisdiction and choice-of-law theories throughout
the years, with a particular focus on the advents of, and legal adaptations to,
new technologies.
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Gatekeeper of Civil Litigation
Personal jurisdiction is, put simply, “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.” 86 “Personal jurisdiction asks a simple
question. It asks whether a particular court may enter judgment against a
particular defendant in a particular case.”87 Unlike choice of law—which is
open-ended in the sense that each party may argue for application of a different set of laws and the court may apply still a third set of laws not advanced by either party—personal jurisdiction is a binary battle. That is to
say that it is either existent or not; 88 there is no possible “third outcome”
that a court might reach. Personal jurisdiction is also unique from choice of

85. See Charles W. Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine:
A Case Study on the Effect of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2005) (personal jurisdiction); Genevieve
G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1793, 1796 (2009) (choice of law). But see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power . . . must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”). Many states, however, provide for personal
jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent allowable within the contours of constitutional
due process. In this instance, courts sometimes “pass over” the state-law analysis and “collapse it
into[] the due process inquiry.” Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593
F.3d 1249, 1258 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2010).
86. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
87. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 979 (2009).
88. See Rhodes, supra note 85, at 136–37.
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law in that it is one-sided, that is, there is no such thing as a court lacking
personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff.89
The following Subparts trace the history of personal jurisdiction 90—
from its roots in the English common law, 91 to the landmark Supreme Court
case International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 92 up through the close of the
Pre-Network Era. 93 We break at the advent of the Internet because although
each of these aforementioned periods is distinct from the period before or
after it, they all share the common theme that personal jurisdiction is based
on some notion of physicality. 94 In other words, the defendant—either in
personam or, in the case of a business, by way of a distributed product in
commerce—had to be physically present in some sense in the jurisdiction
where the lawsuit was initiated for jurisdiction to be proper. As we discuss
later, however, the advent of the Internet changed this longstanding notion,
and personal-jurisdiction Internet cases thus cannot—or at least in our view,
should not—be grouped with these previous cases reflecting comparatively
small adjustments of the technological rudder.
1. The Old Guard: Physical Presence and the Transient Rule
The notion of personal jurisdiction over a party dates back to fifteenth
century England. As early as 1482, the idea that the judgment of a court
that lacked jurisdiction over a defendant was void had already gained a
foothold, 95 and the principle became firmly cemented into the English
common law by Lord Coke more than a century later. 96 At that time,

89. Cf. Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction
and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508–09 (1987) (“[M]odern courts continue
to perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between state power and the defendant, with
the plaintiff’s interest being largely irrelevant.”).
90. Like others before us who have opined on personal jurisdiction, we “recognize the merit
of critics of legal scholarship who decry the recitation of cases that make up the history of a doctrine.” John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015,
1019 n.21 (1983) (citing Lawrence R. Velvel, Suggested Improvements in Legal Education, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 194, 201 (1978) (noting the “often boring descriptions of the relevant cases”)).
Nevertheless, we find it useful to provide a brief summary of the important decisions in this area
of the law, especially given the vast departure from traditional brick-and-mortar, single-location
entities that cloud-computing service providers represent.
91. See infra Part III.A.1.
92. See infra Part III.A.2.
93. See infra Part III.A.3.
94. See Perdue, supra note 89, at 509 (noting the long held presumption “that the proper
scope of personal jurisdiction is closely tied to geographic boundaries”).
95. Bowser v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482).
96. Case of the Marshalsea, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.) 1039.
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though, jurisdiction was based primarily on a defendant’s consent to a
court’s ability to adjudicate a particular dispute, as opposed to a court’s
power over a party. 97 Perhaps not surprisingly, this submissiveness gradually morphed into courts obtaining defendants’ consent by inducement or
force, 98 and around the turn of the nineteenth century, English courts’ determinations of jurisdiction appeared to be based more on judicial authority
than on a party’s voluntary submission. 99
Naturally, these concepts migrated from England and became incorporated into early American common law, and several cases from the first half
of the nineteenth century reflected the principle of coram non judice—
”before a person, not a judge.” 100 It was not until 1878, however, that the
U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff 101 established the rule that service
in the forum state was both necessary and sufficient for a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction. In Pennoyer, an Oregon court determined that the defendant, who was neither a resident of Oregon nor physically present in Oregon, had been constructively served by a newspaper publication in Oregon. 102 The Supreme Court disagreed. In finding the service to be
inadequate, the Supreme Court announced what has become known as the
“transient rule” of personal jurisdiction: “To give [judicial] proceedings any
validity . . . [a defendant] must be brought within [a state’s] jurisdiction by
service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.” 103
Immediately after Pennoyer, it appeared that physical presence was
both necessary and sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court over a particular defendant. The “sufficient” prong of that phrase holds true today

97. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956) (“Early judicial procedure depended upon
voluntary subjection of both parties to the court’s judgment.”).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 298 (discussing the English cases Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep.
1021 (K.B.) 1030, 1 COWP. 161, 1076–77 and Buchanan v. Rucker, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546
(K.B.) 547).
100. See, e.g., Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts &
Serg. 447, 448 (Pa. 1844) (“Jurisdiction of the person or property of an alien is founded on its
presence or situs within the territory. Without this presence or situs, an exercise of jurisdiction is
an act of usurpation.”); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273, 275 (1835); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425
(N.Y. Ch. 1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C. Mass. 1828); Grumon v.
Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 45 (Conn. 1814) (“Where there is a want of jurisdiction over the person . . .
it is the same as though there was no court. It is coram non judice.”).
101. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
102. Id. at 719–20.
103. Id. at 733. Pennoyer is also significant in that the Supreme Court announced that personal jurisdiction is based on an individual’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right. Id.
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and was affirmed by the Supreme Court more than a century after Pennoyer
in Burnham v. Superior Court. 104 By contrast, however, the notion of physical presence as a mandatory prerequisite to jurisdiction slowly eroded in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (though perhaps unsurprisingly). 105 For example, subsequent to Pennoyer, some states began
requiring nonresident corporations to designate in-state agents for service of
process, 106 and other states allowed substituted service over nonresident
motorists who caused injury in a state but left before personal service could
be effected. 107 These and other exceptions to the requirement that defendants be actually physically present in a given forum state eventually swallowed the transient rule, 108 and in 1945 the Supreme Court did away with
Pennoyer altogether.
2. The Giant Footprint of International Shoe
“[T]he unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer” 109 were finally put to rest in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 110

104. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). In Burnham, the defendant, a resident of New Jersey, was served
process pertaining to his estranged wife’s divorce petition while he was in California on a business
trip and visiting his children. Id. at 607–08. In affirming the California Court of Appeal, the
Court stated that “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process.” Id. at
619. See also Oxmans’ Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1979) (“Physical presence is the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction.”); Joel H. Spitz, Comment, The “Transient Rule” of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 181, 192 n.83 (1989) (collecting cases that reaffirm that the “sufficient”
prong still holds true).
105. Pennoyer recognized certain exceptions to the rigidity of the physical-presence requirement. See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–35 (divorce actions could be adjudicated in plaintiff’s
home state even if defendant could not be served within that state); id. at 735–36 (approving of
treating a foreign corporation doing business in a state as having consented to being sued in the
state).
106. E.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1882) (summarizing Michigan law regarding service of corporations).
107. E.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164–67 (1916) (summarizing New Jersey law);
see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) (upholding a Massachusetts statute that
appointed the state registrar as a person upon whom process can be served for a nonresident motorist).
108. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 97, at 309–12 (stating that the exceptions “have become so
significant in number and weight that they have virtually overwhelmed the [Pennoyer] rule itself”
and noting several exceptions).
109. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990).
110. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This is true, however, only as to the “necessary” prong of physical
presence as being both “necessary and sufficient.” See supra note 104 and accompanying text
(discussing Burnham and the significance of physical presence with regard to jurisdiction).
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Hailed as a “watershed in the law of personal jurisdiction”111 and revered as
the “prince” that “slew the evil dragon” of Pennoyer, 112 International Shoe
set forth a new governing test for defining the outer bounds of a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction that still serves as the bedrock of the doctrine
today.
International Shoe Co. (“Shoe Co.”) was a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. 113 Shoe Co. manufactured shoes in, and distributed shoes from, several states other than Washington, and did not have any offices or any contracts for the sale or purchase of merchandise in Washington. 114 Shoe Co. did, however, employ
salesmen under the direct supervision and control of managers in St. Louis
and supplied the salesmen with shoe samples that the salesmen would
sometimes exhibit in rented rooms in Washington.115 The salesmen resided
in Washington and were compensated based on sales made there.116 The
salesmen would send shoe orders back to Shoe Co.’s St. Louis office, where
the orders would be filled and the shoes shipped into Washington from other states. 117
The issue in International Shoe was whether Shoe Co., based on the
above-mentioned contacts with Washington, was within the scope of Washington’s Unemployment Compensation Act. 118 If Shoe Co. was, then it
needed to contribute a percentage of its employees’ annual wages to Washington’s state unemployment compensation fund. The State of Washington
sued Shoe Co. for past contributions and personally served a Shoe Co.
salesman in Washington. Shoe Co. then appeared specially to contest jurisdiction. 119 After several appeals, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled
that Shoe Co. was amenable to suit in Washington. 120

111. Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological
Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 59 (2001).
112. Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257,
258 (1990).
113. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 313–14.
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id. at 314.
118. Id. at 311.
119. Id. at 312.
120. See id. at 314 (articulating the Supreme Court of Washington’s reasoning “that the regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellant’s salesman, resulting in a continuous flow of appellant’s product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business in the
state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In doing so, the Court announced the
standard for personal jurisdiction that has been echoed often and thunderously over the last six-plus decades 121:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.122
The Court declined, however, to adopt any sort of bright-line test or
standard that was “mechanical or quantitative” like the Pennoyer test. 123
Instead, the Court determined that whether due process was satisfied depended “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 124 This inquiry requires examining, inter alia, “the
extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state” such that “it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state.” 125
It is worth noting that the Court was clear in International Shoe that
the basis of the suit—Shoe Co.’s obligation to contribute to the state unemployment fund—arose from Shoe Co.’s specific contacts with the forum
state. 126 The Court did not, however, foreclose the notion that jurisdiction
can still be proper even when the events giving rise to a lawsuit are unrelated to a nonresident corporation’s contacts with the forum state.127 In such a
case, jurisdiction is proper because the defendant corporation is said to be
“present” within the forum state by having “systematic and continuous”
contacts. 128

121. See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 437 tbl.3 (2010) (listing International Shoe as the
eighteenth most-cited Supreme Court opinion by federal district courts).
122. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 319; see supra note 103 and accompanying text (setting forth the transient rule
from Pennoyer).
124. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 320.
127. See id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).
128. See id. at 318, 320 (stating that “it may be said that [certain] authorized acts [are] of such
a nature as to justify the fiction” that a corporation has consented to service and suit “through the
acts of its authorized agents” in the forum state).
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3. Stream-of-Commerce and Far-Reaching Effects Theories
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the “minimum contacts” standard in
International Shoe was a reaction to the evolving methods by which business was conducted in the twentieth century. As cross-country and interstate transportation became more prevalent, firms were broadening the
reach of their services and products to consumers in all corners of the country. 129 And while the standard set forth in International Shoe certainly applies to individuals, the opinion itself is plainly geared toward business entities. 130
Although International Shoe is a single case, it is undoubtedly an important one. But, as with many standard-setting cases, the progeny that followed International Shoe is (at least arguably) just as important as International Shoe itself—for it is the subsequent cases interpreting a new standard
that often truly define the standard’s contours. 131 A comprehensive review
of all subsequent cases interpreting and applying International Shoe could
easily consume an entire civil procedure class. Thus, we have chosen to
touch upon only the leading cases to set the stage for discussing the law of
the Internet. 132
We begin with a 1961 case out of the Illinois Supreme Court, Gray v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. 133 In Gray, an Illinois resident sued an Ohio company, alleging negligent construction of a safety
129. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (“In the late 19th and early
20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an ‘inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on
state jurisdiction’ over nonresident individuals and corporations.” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting))).
130. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“Since the corporate personality is a fiction,
although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its ‘presence’ without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Sawyer, supra note 111, at 59–60 (“International Shoe resulted directly from the
inability of the Pennoyer doctrine to adjust to the twentieth century expansion of corporate business. . . . In short, the standard explanation claims International Shoe simply adjusted constitutional doctrine to the practical demands of society.”).
131. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) (“leav[ing] it to future judicial
decisions to determine precisely where the line shall be drawn”); In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of
this standard.”); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (“Whatever precise content may
be given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that
they do not exist here.”); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44–45 (1971) (establishing a new standard for First Amendment libel actions while “leaving the delineation of the reach
of [certain] term[s] to future cases”).
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
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valve on a water heater that had exploded and injured him. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that it did not conduct business in Illinois,
had no agent physically present in Illinois, and sold the valves to another
defendant outside Illinois for incorporation into the water heater.134 The
court recognized that “the defendant’s only contact with [Illinois was]
found in the fact that a product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated in
Pennsylvania, into a hot water heater which in the course of commerce was
sold to an Illinois consumer.” 135
Nevertheless, the court found that this contact passed muster under International Shoe. The court determined that “it is not unreasonable, where
a cause of action arises from alleged defects in [a] product, to say that the
use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement that [a company] defend
here.” 136 This holding was based on “the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing interdependence of business enterprises.” 137 The Gray court’s reasoning has become known as the “stream-ofcommerce theory” in personal jurisdiction. 138
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to accept Gray’s
stream-of-commerce theory for personal jurisdiction. In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 139 the Court rejected the notion that a company having no other contacts with the forum state could be subject to jurisdiction there merely because a consumer transported its product to a state
other than the state where the product was purchased.140 The Court noted
the limits on the stream-of-commerce theory, stating that “‘foreseeability’
alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause,” 141 and asserting that acceptance of the stream-ofcommerce theory in its purest form would have the effect of “appoint[ing]
the chattel [as an] agent for service of process.” 142

134. Id. at 762.
135. Id. at 764.
136. Id. at 766.
137. Id.
138. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 207–08 (2011).
139. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
140. Id. at 299.
141. Id. at 295.
142. Id. at 296.
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Later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 143 the Court
unanimously declined to find personal jurisdiction over a Japanese firm that
manufactured tire valves and sold them to a Taiwanese corporation, which
subsequently incorporated the valves into motorcycle tires sold in California. 144 The Asahi Court held that “a finding of minimum contacts must
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State,” and that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” 145
As we wrap up this Subpart, there is one other case—Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz 146—that warrants individual attention and that serves as
a jumping-off point for our discussion of Internet personal jurisdiction.
Burger King is of particular importance because it is a contract case and, as
detailed above, the legal structure of the cloud is based primarily on a contract theory. 147 Additionally, Burger King deals with intellectual property
(albeit in a roundabout way), a common source of litigation in the cloud. 148
Burger King involved a lawsuit by the Burger King Corporation against two
of its fast-food restaurant franchisees for breach of a franchise agreement
and trademark infringement. 149 Burger King sued in Florida, where its
headquarters were located and where the agreement was primarily negotiated, though the franchisees and individual restaurant at issue were located in
Michigan. 150 The Supreme Court, in reversing the Eleventh Circuit,151 determined that jurisdiction was proper over the defendants even though they
had no physical presence in Florida.152 The Court relied on the defendants’

143. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
144. Id. at 116.
145. Id. at 112. Two very recent Supreme Court cases provide additional support for the idea
that the stream-of-commerce theory is, at least with regard to foreign defendants, surviving only
on life support. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854–57
(2011); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790–91 (2011). For a more
detailed discussion of Goodyear and McIntyre, see Peterson, supra note 138, at 211–18 (Goodyear) and 218–35 (McIntyre).
146. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
147. See supra Part II.C.2.
148. See, e.g., supra note 82.
149. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 468–69.
150. Id. at 464–67.
151. Id. at 487.
152. Id. at 476 (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the
defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”).
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many communications sent via mail regarding the franchisee agreement to
establish the requisite minimum contacts with Florida. 153
In a foreshadowing of future communications technology and the litigation that would ensue as a result, Justice Brennan stated in Burger King:
Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential
defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable
foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which
business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts
are “purposefully directed” toward residents of another State, we
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. 154
4. Summary
What began as a change merely recognized by International Shoe
eventually came to serve as the basis of the holding in Burger King. The
shift from local firms doing business locally, to local firms doing business
nationally, to national firms doing business nationally and internationally,
meant new challenges for courts on issues relating to personal jurisdiction.
Although the current landscape of Internet and cloud commerce could be
phrased roughly as “invisible firms doing business everywhere,” the themes
echoed in the cases above provide valuable insight into the current state of
the law 155 and, crucially for our discussion below, what its future will be.
B. Choice of Law: Rule Maker of Civil Litigation
Choice of law is the pre-merits question that necessarily follows that
of jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, before a court reaches the substantive issues presented by a lawsuit, it must first decide whether it has the authority
to apply any laws to the facts at hand, that is, whether it has jurisdiction. 156

153. Id. at 479–82.
154. Id. at 476.
155. See, e.g., Richard Philip Rollo, Note, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: It Is
Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 678 (1999) (“Many courts hold that the appropriate personal jurisdiction standard based upon Internet contacts is analogous to the stream of commerce standard in Asahi.”).
156. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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If jurisdiction is proper, courts must then determine which law or set of
laws it ought to apply—it must make a “choice of law.” 157
The evolution 158 of choice of law in the United States has followed an
uneven path. As an initial note, “choice of law” is a somewhat nebulous
term in U.S. jurisprudence and scholarship. Depending on the speaker, it
can encompass concepts as far-ranging as the recognition and enforcement
of judgments, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws, and “vertical” conflicts
between federal and state laws. As used herein, however, “choice of law”
refers to situations where the laws of two or more jurisdictions might conceivably govern a set of actions or events. Put another way, it contemplates
“horizontal” conflicts between laterally situated laws. It is within this area
of focus that the following Parts briefly retrace the history of U.S. choiceof-law theory and summarize the primary modes of analysis still in use today.
1. The Traditional Theories: Sovereignty, Comity, and “Vested
Rights”
Choice of law arose as a discrete area of jurisprudence in the United
States following the publication of Justice Story’s treatise, Commentaries
on the Conflict of Laws, in 1824. As travel and trade between the states
grew more prevalent, Story recognized that the common-law rule—English
courts had always applied English law—was fast becoming antiquated.
Story proposed two theoretical principles that greatly influenced subsequent
courts and scholars: (1) each state has “exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory”; 159 and as a result, (2) the court of one sovereign jurisdiction may apply another sovereign’s laws, but it does so only as
a matter of comity, that is, out of a sense of benevolence or neighborliness
toward the foreign sovereign. 160 Justice Story’s tenets, metaphysical as
they were, unsurprisingly proved difficult to implement, for the Commentaries gave no real instructions on how or when the principles should be ap-

157. As an initial note, there is a strain of thought in conflicts scholarship—the “local law”
theory—that posits a different structure. Under this view, courts always apply forum law—even
when adjudicating disputes by referring to the content of foreign law—given that they have no
power to do otherwise. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 822, 824–25 (1950). This theory has become relatively marginal today. See, e.g., Louise
Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1634–37 (2005).
158. In this context, even that word is an arguable choice, implying as it does that the law has,
in fact, progressed. See infra Part III.B.2.
159. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1883).
160. Id. § 38.
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plied. It would be over a century before another scholar attempted to supply those answers.
In 1934, the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (“First Restatement”) was promulgated, with Professor Joseph Beale as its primary architect. Underlying the First Restatement was the theory that an individual’s
legal cause of action was a legal right, one that inhered—or “vested”—in
that individual at a specific point in time. 161 It followed, under Beale’s logic, that the state within whose sovereign borders such a right vested should
be the state whose substantive law applies to any ensuing litigation.162 Justice Story’s notion of territorial “sovereignty” as critical to choice-of-law
analysis was thus carried forward by Beale. 163
Unsurprisingly, given its theoretical underpinnings, the First Restatement approach heavily emphasized physical location and territoriality. The
obvious problem, of course, lies in determining the precise temporal and
spatial point at which rights vested, leading Beale to enunciate a rigid set of
rules that were supposed to do just that. Broadly speaking, the First Restatement rules specify which aspects of which events indicate that a cause
of action has become a vested right, pinpointing a moment in time and
space where the location of individuals, property, or events indicate the jurisdiction whose laws ought to apply. 164
More specifically, the First Restatement sets forth three primary rules
that govern tort, contract, and property law disputes. In tort, whether a
cause of action exists is dependent on lex locus delicti, the “law of the place
of wrong.” 165 Additional sections enumerate specific issues that are so
governed. 166 As to contract, the relevant rule depends on whether the dispute at bar involves contract formation or performance. Issues involving
161. See JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8A.8 (1935).
162. Beale’s rules were, as David Cavers pointed out, “jurisdiction-selecting rule[s],” that is,
they required a court to determine which jurisdiction’s set of laws applied to a case, rather than
which law should apply. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 173, 194 (1933).
163. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 36 & n.133 (2010) (“The first question in any conflicts case for Beale . . . was to determine the jurisdiction of nations . . . because Beale viewed law
as fundamentally territorial and, thus, no law had effect outside of its own territory.”).
164. See generally William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional
Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196 (1997) (analyzing contemporary applications of the First Restatement).
165. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934) (interstate torts).
166. E.g., id. §§ 378 (whether a cognizable injury occurred) and 379 (whether liability is strict
or dependent on negligence or intent).
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contract formation are governed by the law of the state where the contract
was formed; 167 issues involving performance are governed by the law of the
place of performance.168 Conflicts involving real property fall under the
“situs” rule, that is, they are governed by the law of the place where the
property is situated. 169 Many, though not all, conflicts involving movable
property are also covered by this rule.170
On the whole, Beale’s vested-rights theory was designed to provide a
unified framework under which courts could easily and mechanically determine which set of laws should apply to disputes with multijurisdictional
elements, thus furthering the formalist school’s cherished goals of uniformity and predictability of outcomes. Indeed, “it was generally believed that
the entire field could be covered by a relatively small number of simple
rules.” 171 This promise of efficiency and restraint on judicial discretion led
to the First Restatement’s rapid adoption by most states. 172
Yet Beale’s territorial rules, elegant as they may have been in theory,
utterly failed to produce uniform results in practice. Judges faced with applying inflexible rules to complex choice-of-law questions almost immediately began using “escape devices.” 173 Perhaps the most widely used escape device was “characterization.” Though Beale had implicitly assumed
otherwise, determining what sort of issue is at play in a given choice-of-law
case (for example, contract performance versus formation) is a process that
leaves considerable wiggle room for judges inclined to pursue normative
ends. Consider a breach-of-contract case where the parties dispute whether
the obligor’s performance satisfied an arguably ambiguous contract term.
Is the issue one of contract-making (causing the law of the place of contracting to apply) due to the contract’s inclusion of the ambiguous term, or
one of performance (causing the law of the place of contract performance to
apply)? In such instances, the First Restatement left enough latitude for
courts to engage in “characterization” and ultimately choose the law that

167. Id. § 332 (validity of contracts).
168. Id. § 358 (duty for performance).
169. Id. §§ 214–54 (law governing “Immovables”).
170. Compare, e.g., id. §§ 255–310 (law governing “Movables”), with id. §§ 303 (intestate
succession governed by law of decedent’s domicile), 306 (same for testamentary succession).
171. Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 679 (1963).
172. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357, 357 (1992) (“Until 1963 the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (the First
Restatement) commanded a nearly universal following.”).
173. Richman & Riley, supra note 164, at 1199.
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appeared to be more equitable, appropriate, or perhaps easier to apply. 174
Other such escape devices included renvoi 175 and the public policy exception. 176
Clearly, many courts were unwilling to surrender the ability to choose
which law ought to apply in a case, even where their jurisdiction had nominally adopted the supposedly rigid, mechanistic First Restatement approach.
This was not universally true—many judges have, over time, striven to apply the First Restatement rules as faithfully as possible. And, particularly in
“easy” cases, the First Restatement does offer a structured analysis that
some judges find appealing. Even today, ten jurisdictions still follow the
First Restatement approach for tort claims, and twelve follow it in contract
disputes. 177 By any measure, however, it has fallen into steep decline relative to its former predominance.
2. The Modern Approaches: Governmental Interest Analysis, the
Second Restatement, and “Better Law”
After only a few decades—a period that has been called, only halfjokingly, the “Reign of Terror” 178—the ascendency of the vested-rights theory began to wane. The next revolution in choice-of-law analysis was ignited by a series of articles authored by Professor Brainerd Currie.179 According to Currie, the primary problem with Beale’s “jurisdiction-selecting”

174. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1878) (providing an often-cited example
of characterization).
175. In the breach-of-contract example used above, renvoi would entail the forum court choosing not only to apply a foreign jurisdiction’s substantive contract law, but also that jurisdiction’s
choice-of-law rules (i.e., the forum would “accept the renvoi”). In instances where the foreign
jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rule would refer the case to yet another jurisdiction, choosing to accept the renvoi would obviously affect the outcome—and perhaps allow a provincially minded
forum court to apply its own law even under the guise of obeying Beale’s rules. For an example
of this in action, see Univ. of Chi. v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175, 176 (Mich. 1936) (applying Illinois
law to a Michigan case).
176. Some courts held that, where applying the law of another jurisdiction would conflict with
a “fundamental” public policy of their own legislature or executive, “sovereignty” would win out
and forum law should apply. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1371, 1378 (1997).
177. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-Law in the American Courts in 2011: TwentyFifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309 tbl.1 (2012) (displaying an alphabetical list of
U.S. states and the choice-of-law methodologies followed by each).
178. Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1376.
179. See Gary J. Simson, Choice-of-Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs
of the Interstate and International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REV. 715, 716 (2012) (“[Currie’s]
writings, far more than anyone else’s, sparked what many have come to call a ‘revolution’ in
choice-of-law.”).
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rules 180 was that they failed entirely to take account of a sovereign’s interests. That is, once a court selected the proper jurisdiction wherein a litigant’s right had vested, it was to apply that jurisdiction’s law without any
regard to whether the foreign sovereign actually had any legitimate interest
in having its law apply to the facts at hand. 181 In short, Currie argued that
courts ought to consider such interests in making choice-of-law decisions.
Applying this “interest analysis,” judges could weed out “false conflicts”—
situations in which only one jurisdiction has any actual interest in seeing its
law applied. Of course, not all conflicts are so easily adjudicated. As to
“real” conflicts, Currie settled on the arguably unprincipled rule that courts
should default to applying the law of the forum. 182
Within scholarly circles, at least, interest analysis (in all its various iterations 183) rapidly came to dominate the field of choice of law. Today,
however, only two jurisdictions still follow in Currie’s footsteps, and those
two do so only for tort claims. 184 Perhaps because it was such a radical
shift from the First Restatement—and because it seemed to run directly
counter to the goals of uniformity and predictability that had animated the
First Restatement’s widespread adoption in the first place—interest analysis
in its pure form has failed to gain widespread acceptance among courts.185
In a watered-down form, however, Currie’s interest analysis was incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Second Restatement”). The Second Restatement, promulgated in 1971 and still in effect today, is a curious mélange: it contains Currie’s precepts, nestled
within a more open-ended, policy-oriented analytical framework, yet it also
sets forth territorial-centric presumptions that bear a strong resemblance to
the rigid rules of the First Restatement. The overarching rule, regardless of
the substantive law, is that the applicable law is that of the state with the
“most significant relationship” to the relevant events and parties.186
180. Cavers, supra note 162, at 194.
181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
182. Currie’s default-to-forum rule has been criticized by many; for one notable example, see
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1963) (arguing that “[n]ormative resolution of real conflicts cases is possible”).
183. See, e.g., id. at 18 (explaining the least-impairment method).
184. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 (identifying California and the District of Columbia as the only jurisdictions following Currie’s interest analysis).
185. See Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1383–84 (“The influence [of Currie], however, is almost solely in the academy; although judges often mention Currie, they rarely follow his lead.”).
186. See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL. L.
REV. 623, 646 (2012) (noting that most “American courts . . . have adopted the most significant
relationship approach” to resolving conflicts of laws and “have abandoned the traditional vestedrights approach”).
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The Second Restatement’s analytical structure involves three steps.
First, the issue must be categorized as, for example, a “contracts” problem
or a “torts” problem. 187 Second, to help determine which state has the most
significant relationship, the Second Restatement creates a set of presumptions contained in specific sections that cover various types of tort or contract issues. 188 But because these rules are only presumptions,189 the analysis does not end there. Instead, a court must decide which state truly has the
most significant relationship in light of enunciated general choice-of-law
principles 190 and the lists of relevant contacts for tort 191 or contract 192 issues.
The Second Restatement has been “savaged” by the majority of legal
scholars. 193 Yet courts have eagerly embraced it, likely because its presumptive rules provide at least the appearance of structure while its more
general factors allow a fair amount of flexibility. 194 Partly as a result of this
judicial popularity, no strong push has been made toward promulgating a
187. See Harold P. Southerland, A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 27 VT. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2002) (describing the framework of the Second Restatement).
188. See id. at 9 (explaining that “[t]he specific rules of the Second Restatement . . . are cast
only in the form of presumptions”).
189. See id. (“[I]t is vital to recognize that in every case the presumption can be rebutted by
reference to the general principles sections read in light of the choice-influencing principles”).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). Section 6 states those principles as follows:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of
the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
191. For tort issues, the “[c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered.” Id. § 145(2).
192. As to contract issues, absent an ex ante choice made by the parties, “the contacts to be
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Id. § 188(2).
193. Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1388.
194. See id. at 1389 (“Judges love . . . [t]he Second Restatement [because it] permits them to
rely on its eminent authority; yet it is flexible, guides decisions rather than controls them, and
permits judges to avoid unjust results.”).
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Third Restatement. And the many pitfalls that inhere in any attempt to construct a new, unified choice-of-law theory have led even some scholars to
conclude that we ought to simply “leave bad enough alone.” 195 Despite its
shortcomings, then, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Second Restatement
remains the most widely adopted choice-of-law methodology in the United
States. 196 Notably, however, it is used by only a plurality of jurisdictions, 197
leaving room for still more competing theories to be developed and adopted.
Professor Robert Leflar, writing in the 1960s, proposed the “Leflar” or
“better law” approach to choice-of-law analysis. 198 Leflar contended that a
set of five “choice-influencing considerations” should be used to decide
among multiple competing laws. 199 Included in Leflar’s considerations
were maximizing predictability of results, maintaining interstate and international order, simplifying the judicial task, advancing the forum jurisdiction’s own governmental interests, and—most famously—applying the
“better” rule of law. 200 The last consideration contemplates a sort of qualitative, normative inquiry that remains unique among choice-of-law rules. 201
Within the United States, five states have adopted the better-law approach
for tort cases; two have done so for contract claims. 202
3. Lex Fori: Choosing Not to Decide
A handful of states have at some point formally adopted a form of the
“lex fori” 203 approach to choice of law. Under this approach, courts gener-

195. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Commentary, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 IND. L.J. 649, 651–
52 (2000) (“Whatever the shortcomings of the Second Restatement, I am persuaded that a third is
almost certain to be worse.”).
196. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (identifying twenty-eight states that apply
some form of the Second Restatement in determining choice-of-law).
197. See id. (noting that twenty-four states use the Second Restatement methodology for tort
cases and twenty-three for contract cases).
198. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 295–304 (1966).
199. Id. at 282.
200. Id.
201. Cf. Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1582–83 (2011) (“[The better-law] test differs from the others in that it openly requires an evaluation of the substance of the contending laws.”).
202. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (stating that only Arkansas, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Wisconsin employ the better-law approach in tort cases; and
only Minnesota and Wisconsin apply it in contract cases).
203. Meaning, literally, “[t]he law of a forum.”
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ally apply what amounts to a presumption in favor of applying the law of
the forum. Thus, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that
“[it] will apply Michigan law unless a ‘rational reason’ to do so otherwise
exists.” 204 Michigan’s approach has been described as a “hybrid lex fori
system,” 205 one that “combines a presumption in favor of forum law with
governmental interest analysis.” 206 Kentucky, by way of contrast, once
used a strict lex fori approach, 207 but the current state of its law is somewhat
less clear—it now purports to apply lex fori rules (the “any significant contacts” test) in tort and the Second Restatement in contract disputes.208 Yet,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently applied Second Restatement principles in a tort action, reasoning that the specific choice-of-law issue at bar
was evidentiary in nature and was therefore “neither a tort nor a contract issue.” 209
Finally, Nevada courts at one time applied a version of the lex fori approach to conflicts of law in tort cases. As the Nevada Supreme Court formulated its (now-defunct) rule, “the law of the forum (the place where the
action is brought) governs in a tort case, unless another state has an overwhelming interest.” 210 Nevada has since, however, formally adopted the
Second Restatement approach. 211 Today, only Kentucky and Michigan are
identified as overtly using lex fori, 212 though it appears in various lesser iterations in other jurisdictions. 213
4. Moving Forward: Defining Normative Goals
Cloud-computing markets are presently among the most dynamic markets across all industries. The scope and speed of innovation in the cloud
204. Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997).
205. Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 574 (2002).
206. Id.
207. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) (“When the court has jurisdiction
of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law. The basic law is the
law of the forum, which should not be displaced without valid reasons.”).
208. Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Ky. 2009).
209. Id.; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009:
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 291 (2010) (discussing Saleba).
210. Motenko v. MGM Distrib., Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996), overruled by Gen. Motors Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 134 P.3d 111 (Nev. 2006).
211. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 P.3d at 116 (“We take this opportunity to clarify Nevada’s
choice-of-law jurisprudence and hold that the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship
test governs choice-of-law issues in tort actions . . . .”).
212. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1.
213. See infra Part V.A.3.
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has, thus far, been breathtaking. 214 As discussed above, the transition to
cloud computing as the dominant computing paradigm—while made possible by the buildup of robust Internet architecture, advances in data-center
technology and design, and an array of other developments—represents an
evolution into uncharted territory. 215 And as such, the cloud also offers a
tabula rasa, a clean slate, upon which jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules
might be written so as to avoid the missteps courts have made when confronted with the rise of the Internet.
A robust and growing body of economic theory and empirical research
demonstrates that the welfare gains from innovation—both in terms of consumer and total welfare—far outweigh the gains from ensuring efficient
static price competition,216 which had for decades been the focus of competition enforcement. 217 Consequently, institutions in the United States and
elsewhere have recognized that protecting innovation ought to be a primary
goal of the law in legal fields such as competition (antitrust), 218 intellectual
property, 219 privacy, 220 telecommunications,221 and diverse other areas. 222

214. See, e.g., Won Kim, Cloud Computing: Today and Tomorrow, 8 J. OBJECT TECH. 65,
65–66 (2009) (discussing the advances in computing and information technologies that allow the
computing field to envision a transition into the cloud computing era).
215. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.
216. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 581, 603 (2009) (“Industry after industry can demonstrate gains from dynamic
(innovation-driven) competition that overshadow the gains when competition is present but innovation is absent.”); see Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence 19–20 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 317, 2002), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.318059.
217. This arguably misguided focus on “allocative” efficiency is generally associated with the
Chicago School of Economics. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying
the New Antitrust Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479,
1480 (1998-1999) (“[T]he model of neoclassical price theory as interpreted by the so-called Chicago School[] incorporates a static view of competition and an exaggerated faith in entry and market forces . . . .”).
218. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 23–24 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (devoting
an entire subsection to “Innovation and Product Variety”).
219. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2011) (proposing various reforms to IP laws that would promote innovation).
220. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
221. See Bhagwat, supra note 217, at 1480.
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Innovation-derived welfare gains have driven the rapid deployment and
adoption of the cloud to date. 223
Given that cloud computing represents such an innovative, dynamic
field, it lies at the core of these policy concerns. And given that it constitutes a relatively clean slate, it also represents a unique opportunity to implement rules and methodologies that further these concerns. 224 As a baseline, any discussion of what normative goals jurisdiction and choice-of-law
jurisprudence should seek to further in the context of cloud computing must
include the promotion and protection of innovation.
Much like the emergence of the Internet, the rise of cloud computing
both informs, and is informed by, the broader trend of globalization—
political, social, legal, and economic cross-border interaction and integration—that has emerged as a master narrative in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. By allowing true location independence,225 cloud
computing represents (as did the rise of ubiquitous Internet access) a paradigm shift toward cosmopolitanism. 226 And as a purely technical matter,
cloud services would function best in a homogenized, borderless world. 227
Such a world would maximize cloud-sourcing efficiencies by allowing
seamless workload migration around the globe.228
Yet, as noted above, the challenge of globalization—in the realm of
cloud computing no less than elsewhere—lies not in ignoring cultural differences, but in simultaneously fostering cross-border interaction and respecting nonlocal structures and traditions. The shift to the cloud is a shift
toward consumption of computing as a service; it is consequently also a
shift toward a contractual paradigm for interactions.229 Hence, the rate of
adoption of cloud processes will depend (at least in part) upon the willing-

222. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1779 (2008) (“In addition to supporting voluntary obligations, [contract
law] also . . . permit[s] and encourage[s] normative innovation . . . .”).
223. See supra Part II.C (discussing the relative advantages of cloud computing over traditional, localized computing).
224. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
225. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59; Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 (“Location independence means, from the customer’s perspective, that the services can be accessed from anywhere with suitable communications links.”).
226. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 321–22
(2002).
227. See supra Part II.C.1.
228. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of workload
migration).
229. See supra Part II.C.2.
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ness and ability of parties to contract. And as contract theorists have recognized, maximizing trust and mutual respect and minimizing information
asymmetries among parties (and potential parties) increases the number,
scope, and efficiency of contract-based interactions. 230
Thus, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules in the cloud can
best serve the aims of fostering cross-border dealings, respecting unique
structures and traditions, and promoting the dissemination of innovation by
seeking to achieve three values. First, personal jurisdiction and choice-oflaw approaches should function predictably, that is, in such a way that parties can ex ante form reasonably educated guesses as to what forum is proper for suit and what set of laws will apply to their interactions and order
those interactions accordingly. Second, and relatedly, personal jurisdiction
and choice-of-law approaches should function in an open and transparent
manner. And third, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law approaches
should function objectively, that is, without unduly favoring either local
parties over foreign parties, local law over foreign law, or plaintiffs over defendants. Such features can function to increase the trust and mutual respect that are essential for coordinated social behavior, 231 while decreasing
inefficient information asymmetries.
Drawing on these normative goals, Parts IV and V below set forth
frameworks for analyzing personal jurisdiction and choice of law in the
cloud. First, these Parts analyze cases and decisions involving Internet disputes and explain why the rules applied—either procedural or substantive—
are not only incongruous for cloud-computing cases, but also unworkable in
practice. These Parts then propose a series of rules and analytical structures
better tailored to resolve these difficult, yet critically important, threshold
questions in cloud-computing disputes.

230. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 762–63 (1992) (“Strategic bargaining under asymmetric information creates the possibility of contractual inefficiency, . . . the revelation of information
can . . . affect efficiency by changing how people bargain.”).
231. Cf., e.g., Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2008) (“To coordinate their behavior, people must say what they will
do and do what they say. Contractual commitment is the fundamental means for economic coordination provided by law. According to the contract principle for coordination, the law should
enable people to commit to doing what they say. When this principle is implemented, people can
trust each other enough to work together . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE CLOUD
The inherent technological nature of cloud computing beckons novel
issues of personal jurisdiction. 232 The fact that servers may be situated remotely in one location, accessed and manipulated from a second location,
and utilized by third-parties in other, sometimes multiple, locations calls into question where a defendant in a lawsuit arising from such a transaction
will be subject to personal jurisdiction. Certainly the defendant would be
subject to personal jurisdiction in at least one of these locations, but which
one(s)? And if jurisdiction is proper where the servers are physically located, what additional problems arise when the servers are mobile, as is the
case with the marine-based server farms described in Google’s patent? 233
Before resolving these questions through a series of innovative proposals, we first pick up where we left off at the end of Part III.A with the
evolution of modern commerce via mass-communication means. Part IV.A
first examines personal-jurisdiction cases involving Internet transactions.
Although likening the Internet to the cloud is not a strict apples-to-apples
comparison, 234 the Internet was both a precursor to the cloud and, arguably
more importantly, makes large-scale cloud computing possible. Thus,
courts’ approaches to jurisdiction in Internet cases provide a useful foundation for assessing similar issues that deal with cloud computing. Part IV.B
then explains why—despite the Internet’s close relationship with cloud
computing—the Internet model is not a square-peg–square-hole fit for the
cloud and why applying Internet personal-jurisdiction doctrines to cloudcomputing disputes could lead to undesired consequences. Finally, Part
IV.C sets forth a set of novel proposals for personal jurisdiction in the cloud
and offers predictable and comprehensive solutions for courts and litigants
to use in navigating these skies.
A. Lessons from Internet Personal-Jurisdiction Jurisprudence
Prior to the dot-com boom of the 1990s, personal jurisdiction was tied
almost exclusively to companies’ physical locations.235 But the advent of

232. See, e.g., Dykstra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 32 (“Determining jurisdiction in cloudcomputing environments is unlike any prior jurisdiction analysis. Even more than websites, cloud
computing is neither jurisdictional nor multi-jurisdictional. It is non-jurisdictional in that physical
geography frequently does not matter.”).
233. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 713–14.
234. See supra Parts II.B and C.
235. Am. Bar Ass’n, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 BUS. LAWYER 1801, 1922 (2000) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction arose in the pre-Internet world, a court could look to the location of the seller
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the Internet transformed the conventional notion that businesses necessarily
operate out of brick-and-mortar facilities.236 As globalization and the Internet modernized commercial life, communication and transaction methods
evolved as well—what we now refer to as “snail mail” yielded to email, and
shopping (both for commodities and specialty items alike) in conventional
four-wall stores gave way to online purchasing and auction websites such as
eBay and Amazon. Recall Justice Brennan’s portending statement from
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz that “it is an inescapable fact of modern
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by
mail and wire communications across state lines.” 237 This doctrinal shift
thrust courts into a modern-day “Wild West” for addressing questions of
personal jurisdiction. 238
Fortunately, some early judicial decisions laid the groundwork for later
courts charged with assessing whether personal jurisdiction was proper over
an online-only defendant. While the case law on this issue is already robust, we need only examine the primary approaches that gained traction and
were broadly adopted before turning our attention to the applicability of
these approaches in the cloud.
1. The Zippo Website Continuum
The most prominent test for assessing personal jurisdiction over
online-only defendants that emerged from early cases was the passiveversus-active website test, haling from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc. 239 In Zippo, the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation that
produced the well-known “Zippo” brand of lighters, sued the defendant, a
California corporation, alleging cyber-squatting 240 on the domain names

and the location of the buyer to determine if the court had, for personal jurisdiction, . . . a nexus
with the physical location of either the buyer or the seller.”).
236. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The Internet
represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of . . . historical, globe-shrinking trends. It
enables anyone with the right equipment and knowledge . . . to operate an international business
cheaply, and from a desktop.”).
237. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
238. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997)
(noting how the parties “attempted to tame the ‘Wild West’ of the Internet”); Ann Davis, Tangled
Web: How the Net Became Land of Opportunity for Legal Profession, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct.
14, 1997, at A1 (noting the Internet’s “freewheeling, new-frontier style”).
239. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). For a sense of just how novel the Internet was to
courts at this time, consider that the Zippo court went out of its way to explain the meaning of
domain names, websites, and the World Wide Web. Id. at 1121 n.1 & 2.
240. For an explanation of cyber-squatting, see Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Cybersquatting:
Identity Theft in Disguise, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2001) (“Cybersquatting occurs
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zippo.com, zippo.net, and zipponews.com. 241 The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 242 The court found
that the defendant did not have any offices, employees, or computer servers
in Pennsylvania and that its contacts with Pennsylvania “occurred almost
exclusively over the Internet.”243 Those Internet contacts in Pennsylvania
included the defendant’s website, which offered a news service to end users
who subscribed and paid with a credit card for membership; contracts with
seven Internet-access providers in Pennsylvania to permit subscribers to access the defendant’s news service; and approximately three thousand Pennsylvania residents who subscribed to the news service. 244
The Zippo court, in analyzing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper, recognized that “the development of
the law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on
Internet use [was] in its infant stages,” 245 and that the case law was
“scant.” 246 As a starting point, then, the court relied on traditional notions
of personal jurisdiction from International Shoe and its progeny. 247 The
court proceeded to distinguish the facts before it from cases involving what
it called merely “passive” websites, i.e., websites that simply post information without allowing for user interaction,248 as well as “interactive”
websites, i.e., websites that allow for user interaction but without conducting any commerce. 249 In doing so, the court developed a continuum of what
Internet activity on a website is sufficient to rise to the level of “minimum
contacts” with the forum state such that jurisdiction is proper.
The Zippo sliding scale is as follows: “At one end of the spectrum are
situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet,” that
when an individual registers a domain name that is an existing trademark, famous mark, or individual’s name.”).
241. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1123.
246. Id. at 1123–24.
247. See id. at 1124 (“Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper. Different results should not be reached simply because business is conducted over the Internet.” (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
248. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125 (discussing and distinguishing Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
249. Id. at 1124–25 (discussing and distinguishing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
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is, “enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet.” 250 In situations like these, personal jurisdiction is proper because the
defendant purposely avails itself of doing business in a given foreign jurisdiction. 251 “At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in
foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make
information available . . . is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” 252 Finally, “[t]he middle ground is occupied by interactive Web
sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the Web site.” 253
Ultimately, the Zippo court determined that personal jurisdiction was
proper over the California defendant. 254 The decision is an important one
not for its result, however, but rather for its process. Indeed, numerous circuit courts subsequently adopted Zippo’s passive-to-active website continuum for assessing personal jurisdiction. 255 Yet Zippo also had its critics, as
some courts criticized its sliding scale for being too narrow and inapposite
to cases of general jurisdiction,256 and other courts viewed any specialized
test for cases involving the Internet as being entirely unnecessary for engaging in a jurisdictional analysis. 257 Consequently, Zippo fell short of domi-

250. Id. at 1124.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1128.
255. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The
opinion in Zippo . . . has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon
the operation of an Internet web site.”); see also Michael A. Geist, Toward Greater Certainty for
Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1367–71 & n.114 (2001) (collecting and
discussing cases adopting Zippo).
256. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the sliding scale
“is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated contacts with forum
residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general personal jurisdiction”).
257. See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“‘Cyberspace . . . is not some mystical incantation capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts
built from bricks and mortar. Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdiction have proven
adaptable to other changes in the national economy, so too are they adaptable to the transformations wrought by the Internet.”); see also TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction
Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539–42 (2004)
(arguing that the Internet does not require any tailored test for assessing personal jurisdiction).
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nating the field of Internet personal jurisdiction, and competing alternatives
quickly arose in its wake.
2. The Calder “Effects” Test
A second test employed in personal-jurisdiction cases involving the Internet is the so-called “effects” test. Unlike the Zippo continuum, however—which was created as a direct response to the advent of the Internet—
the effects test was fashioned prior to Internet litigation and was merely
adapted to suit the technology of the times. The effects test is rooted in the
1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision Calder v. Jones. 258 In Calder, a California woman sued a Florida-based publication and a Florida reporter and
Florida editor, in their individual capacities, alleging libel in a published article. 259 The individual defendants argued that jurisdiction was not proper
in California because to find otherwise would “in effect appoint the [article
as their] agent for service of process.” 260 Despite gravitating toward a similar argument in Volkswagen, 261 the Court rejected this notion in Calder.
The Court distinguished Volkswagen by noting that in Calder, the defendants “expressly aimed” their actions at California by “edit[ing] an article
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact” on a California
resident. 262 The Court noted that although the journalists did not have any
relevant physical contacts with the forum, “California [was] the focal point
both of the story and of the harm suffered,” and jurisdiction was thus proper
“based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” 263
The Calder effects test was subsequently incorporated into jurisprudence dealing with online disputes. In Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., for example, a California court exercised jurisdiction over a
North Carolina defendant under the effects theory for registering and operating websites with confusingly similar domain names and allegedly infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks. 264 The court determined that jurisdiction
was proper, finding that “[t]he brunt of the harm was suffered in [California]” because the plaintiff was “based” there.265 Similarly, in Blakey v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff sued in New Jersey state court for
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Id. at 784–86.
Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 142.
Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90.
Id. at 788–89.
89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156–57 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 1159–60.
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defamation based on comments posted to an online discussion forum by defendants, who were nonresidents of New Jersey. 266 The court in Blakey
found that jurisdiction was proper, reasoning that “[b]ecause defamation
was alleged to be part of the harassing conduct that took place on the
[online forum], it would be fair to posit jurisdiction where the effects of the
harassment were expected or intended to be felt.” 267
Despite the effects test being technology-neutral on its face, 268 some
courts have viewed it in its purest form as being too plaintiff-friendly when
applied to disputes involving Internet activity. The Fourth Circuit has twice
hinted at this conclusion, 269 reasoning that the Internet is available in essentially all jurisdictions and thus a defendant’s posting of information on a
website—such as an allegedly defamatory article as in Calder—could have
“effects” on potential plaintiffs everywhere. 270 The effects test thus misses
the mark in Internet disputes in that it fails to consider whether a defendant
purposefully availed herself to a particular forum. 271 Courts adopting the
Calder approach for the Internet, then—rather than emphasizing the effects
of a defendant’s actions—instead relied on the “expressly aimed” language
in Calder and inquired as to the defendant’s intent to cause harm in the fo-

266. 751 A.2d 538, 555–56 (N.J. 2000).
267. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
268. Compare Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90 (print magazine), with Nissan, 89 F. Supp. 2d at
1156–57 (Internet website), with Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34
F.3d 410, 411–12 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Calder and holding that a defendant “entered” the forum via television broadcast).
269. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that
“Calder does not sweep that broadly”); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d
707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (“This standard for reconciling contacts through electronic media with
standard due process principles is not dissimilar to that applied by the Supreme Court in Calder . . . . Analogously, under the standard we adopt and apply today, specific jurisdiction in the
Internet context may be based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at Maryland and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in Maryland.”).
270. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712–13 (“[T]he Internet is omnipresent—when a person places information on the Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every jurisdiction . . . . [I]t would be difficult to accept a structural arrangement in which each State has unlimited judicial power over every citizen in each other State who uses the Internet.”).
271. See Young, 315 F.3d at 263 (“Something more than posting and accessibility is needed to
indicate that the [newspapers] purposefully (albeit electronically) directed [their] activity in a substantial way to the forum state. . . . The newspapers must, through the Internet postings, manifest
an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted));
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (“If we were to conclude as a general principle that a person’s act of
placing information on the Internet subjects that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in
which the information is accessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a
State has geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist.”).
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rum state. 272 Or stated otherwise, and to borrow a phrase from the Supreme
Court, courts asked whether the defendant “purposely avails” himself of the
benefits of interacting with the forum state.273
B. The Internet’s Incongruence to the Cloud
The Zippo and Calder tests emerged as the two primary methods for
analyzing personal jurisdiction over Internet activities. 274 And because the
Internet is an important (and debatably the principal 275) cog driving the
cloud-computing engine, it might seem at first glance to logically follow
that these tests are transferrable to resolve similar personal-jurisdiction issues that arise in cloud-computing cases. The nature of the cloud, however,
poses barriers to such borrowing by courts.
Unlike the Internet—which is arguably a software phenomenon (notwithstanding its infrastructure considerations)—the holistic concept of
cloud computing is based on storing data, which inherently relies on hardware. 276 Thus, while the Internet allows for interactivity over an essentially
location-less medium, cloud computing is necessarily (and perhaps counterintuitively) “grounded” by aggregated servers on land or in water (as in the
case of Google’s patent).277 Additionally, the Internet has a “face,” so to
speak. That is, most lawsuits involving information on the Internet concern
users’ visual interaction with, and response to, web content.278 By contrast,

272. See e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321–22 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[Toeppen’s] conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in California where Panavision has its principal place of business and where the movie and television
industry is centered. Under the ‘effects test,’ the purposeful availment requirement necessary for
specific, personal jurisdiction is satisfied.” (emphasis added)).
273. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”).
274. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72 (“In th[e] [Internet]
world, new considerations such as a Web site’s ‘interactivity’ [referring to Zippo] and ‘target audience’ [referring to adaptations to Calder] are the essential concepts courts use to determine
whether to treat virtual contacts as minimum contacts.”).
275. See Erica Naone, Computer in the Cloud: Online Desktop Systems Could Bridge the Digital Divide, MIT TECH. REV., Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/408689/
computer-in-the-cloud/ (describing cloud computing as “relying” on the Internet).
276. See supra Part II.C.1.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (trademark claim based on defendant’s website that “displayed a ‘Nissan Computer’
logo that [was] allegedly confusingly similar to the plaintiffs’ ‘Nissan’ logo”); Blakey v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 544 (N.J. 2000) (defendants “publish[ing] a series of what plaintiff
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cloud-computing disputes often involve the “faceless” access to, and manipulation of, information by parties.
To understand these critical distinctions, consider the following hypothetical scenario. A data thief in Illinois hacks into a remote, marine-based
server located in the Caribbean Sea. The server stores credit-card information for numerous credit-lending companies. The thief steals the creditcard information of X, a resident of New York. (We say “X,” as opposed to
“victim” or “plaintiff,” to emphasize the idea that the data thief is unaware
of the identity of this person—to the thief, X could be anyone, located anywhere, and exists merely as an alphanumeric string of characters in a database file.) X’s credit card draws on funds from a checking account with
Bank of America, which is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in North Carolina. The thief then uses that credit card information to make purchases from an online vendor in Europe. Mapping how
the two prominent Internet jurisdiction tests would apply to the circumstances set forth here demonstrates their unworkability in the cloud context.
First, Zippo provides us with minimal, if any, guidance. As we mentioned previously, the Zippo framework is tailored specifically to websites. 279 Thus, while it provides a useful tool when evaluating a defendant’s
outward-facing activity online, it does very little when assessing jurisdiction over a defendant (such as the data thief described above) whose presence was neither seen nor known by the plaintiff (X) until the harm was already inflicted. In other words, in Zippo itself, and in all subsequent cases
that adopted its framework and found personal jurisdiction to be proper,
there was an online interaction between the plaintiff and defendant that varied in some degree of commerciality. 280 The crux of Zippo was simply a
view[ed] as harassing gender-based messages, some of which [plaintiff] alleges are false and defamatory”).
279. See supra Part IV.A.1.
280. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo dot com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125–26 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant “contracted with approximately 3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in [the forum state]”); see also, e.g.,
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant “sold millions of dollars worth of products in California (about six percent of its total sales) through its catalog, its toll-free telephone
number, and its Internet website” and “maintained substantial numbers of ‘on-line’ accounts for
California consumers” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening,
Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890–91 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding personal jurisdiction because “[t]he granting
of passwords to Michigan residents as part of a contract for [defendant’s] services is an interactive
usage showing that [defendant] has intentionally reached out to Michigan customers”); see also
e.g., Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 Fed. Appx. 675, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to find
jurisdiction because plaintiff “ha[d] not alleged that any interaction or exchange of information
occurred between [defendant] and Ohio residents via the website”); BroadVoice, Inc. v. TP Inno-
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matter of the extent to which that interaction was commercial or the defendant targeted end users in the forum state. 281
In the cloud, however, torts do not have to occur through any sort of
website-host-consumer interaction. Oftentimes, as with our scenario above,
the torts that give rise to a cause of action for the data owner are acts on the
data or server itself. Further, the data’s owner is not necessarily aware of
the tortious act until, for example, she checks her credit-card statement.282
In this way, cloud torts can be categorized as unilateral, that is, they require
no affirmative act by the plaintiff and can be carried out unknowingly. The
very nature of the Zippo test, however, requires the plaintiff to commit
some affirmative act (for example, registering to receive a newsletter) for
there to be jurisdiction—defendant–operators of strictly passive websites do
not satisfy the minimum criteria for a finding of personal jurisdiction. 283
Accordingly, the Zippo continuum is nontransferable to the cloud due to its
technological narrowness, as well as because of the apples-to-oranges contrast of website torts versus cloud torts.
Perhaps, then, the Calder effects test—which is broader than the Zippo
test in that it is not technology-limited 284—provides a solution. Recall the
contacts that we set forth above. 285 Under Calder and courts’ modification
of Calder for Internet cases, we must look to either the place where the effects of the tort are felt, or alternatively, where the defendant (the data thief)
“expressly aimed” his actions. 286 For jurisdictional purposes, we can immediately eliminate Europe because that location is merely fortuitous in
that the thief could have made a purchase anywhere once the information
was stolen. Delaware and North Carolina can also be eliminated—were X
bringing an action for recovery of lost funds (which she could also do, but
is not in this scenario), there might be an argument that because the bank is
vations, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (D. Mass. 2010) (declining to find jurisdiction because
defendant’s “website was neither of a commercial nature nor directed specifically to a Massachusetts audience”).
281. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.
282. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (“Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their privacy rights by unlawfully allowing third
party applications (‘apps’) that run on the iDevices to collect and make use of, for commercial
purposes, personal information without user consent or knowledge.” (emphasis added)).
283. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLP, 190 F.3d 333, 337–38 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
Zippo and noting that because customers could not take orders through defendant’s website, the
website did “not classify . . . as anything more than [a] passive advertisement which is not grounds
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction”).
284. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part IV.A.2.
286. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
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said to “hold” X’s funds, the monies could be said to have been “located” in
either Delaware or North Carolina at the time that the theft occurred, and
thus the tort occurred in one of those two locations. The bank, however, is
not responsible for guarding X’s credit-card information, which is contracted through a third party (for example, Visa or American Express).
We are left, then, with New York, the Caribbean Sea, and Illinois.
Under the traditional Calder test, personal jurisdiction would arguably be
proper in New York, as that is the state where X likely discovered that her
credit card had been used without authorization and the “effects” of the tort
were felt. But, query whether jurisdiction in New York would comport
with International Shoe’s mandate of “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice”? 287 Our data thief did nothing to reach out to New
York, did not know X was a citizen of New York, and did not intend to
harm X (at least individually, i.e., personally, as compared to other “faceless” victims). For all we know, our data thief relied on a complex computer algorithm or random-number generator to pull X’s credit-card information from among millions of others’ information in a database. It is safe
to say, then, that our hacker could not reasonably foresee being haled into
court in New York based on actions performed from his computer in Illinois. 288
Surely, then, jurisdiction is proper in Illinois. To be sure, that is where
our data thief is located and where he committed affirmative acts to further
the tortious conduct. But until now, we have assumed some importance to
our data thief residing in Illinois. In reality, though, Illinois is no more significant, and no less fortuitous, than Europe—the location where the creditcard information was subsequently used to make purchases. To find jurisdiction proper in Illinois only, then, would seemingly permit wrongdoers to
engage in a sort of quasi forum shopping by running their illicit activities
from within jurisdictions that are defendant-friendly. This result certainly
was not intended.
We are left with the international waters of the Caribbean Sea—the location of the credit-card company’s servers. Arguably, this is where the final act of the tort (the hacking of the server) was committed.289 It might al287. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
288. That is, that X is a resident of New York provides our data thief with a mere “random”
and “fortuitous” contact to that State, but perhaps not a sufficient contact that gives rise to jurisdiction there. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (“Th[e] ‘purposeful
availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . .” (citation omitted)).
289. Cf. supra Part III.B.1 and notes 161–164 and accompanying text (discussing the “vested
rights” approach and the idea of a final act that gives rise to a cause of action for a tort).
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so be true that several jurisdictions could claim to have an interest in adjudicating the lawsuit (including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which of
course have their own U.S. district courts, but also other countries). But X
would be disadvantaged by being forced to bring suit in any of these jurisdictions. And for the same reasons that a data thief could not reasonably
foresee being haled into court in New York, X would also likely have trouble overcoming the jurisdictional threshold to adjudicate the lawsuit in a
foreign country.
Discussing one by one the locations with some nexus to our factual
scenario above reveals that personal jurisdiction in cloud-computing disputes presents complex issues. Perhaps X would be able to defeat a motion
to dismiss in any of these jurisdictions and, ideally, maintain suit in New
York. In fact, it is likely that jurisdiction is proper in more than one of the
U.S. terra firma jurisdictions, i.e., not in the Caribbean. But the result is indeterminate based on the current rules and frameworks available, and thus
more certainty is desirable.290 That is true for plaintiffs (who wish to know
where to sue), as well as for defendants (who wish to know where they
might be sued). In the section below, we attempt to provide that desired
predictability by offering a series of proposals for addressing personal jurisdiction in cloud-computing disputes.
C. Solutions for Personal Jurisdiction in the Cloud
Before outlining what we propose to be workable solutions to the
cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdiction, it is important to reiterate that our intent and goal is not to make something out of nothing. In
other words, we do not claim to take a situation where no U.S. jurisdiction
is proper—that is, a foreign defendant acting on a foreign server steals a
foreign plaintiff’s account information that draws funds from a foreign
bank—and provide a panacea to magically land the defendant in a U.S.
court. Rather, we assume that jurisdiction is proper based on some U.S.
contacts and that some forums are more favorable for a plaintiff than others.
That is to say that we are concerned less with the result than with the process.
Applying this principle to the hypothetical discussed above, it is not
our contention that the plaintiff, X, will not be able to overcome a motion to
dismiss filed by the data thief. Indeed, a court in New York (X’s state of
residence and likely her first-choice forum) may very well find that it can
maintain an action for invasion of privacy without violating the Illinois data

290. See supra Part III.C (advocating for predictability as a normative goal).
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thief’s due-process rights. But as discussed, the Zippo continuum is nontransferable to the cloud-computing analysis because of its technologyspecific nature, 291 and the Calder doctrine is likewise troublesome due to its
focus on a connection between the plaintiff and defendant ex ante to the
commission of the tort. 292 While this will provide the data thief with little
refuge on the merits of a privacy-invasion claim, it does have some teeth at
the dismissal phase of a lawsuit.
Taking these considerations into account, below are three frameworks
for bringing certainty and predictability to personal-jurisdiction issues in
cloud-computing disputes.
1. Caveat Maleficus Approach
One solution to the cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdiction is a caveat maleficus, or “wrongdoer beware,” approach. This proposal
perhaps best analogizes to the age-old “thin-skull” doctrine in tort law that
is based on the principle that “you take your plaintiff as you find him.” 293
In the cloud, however, the saying might be aptly altered to be, “You take
your plaintiff where you find him.”
Because tortfeasors in the cloud often inflict harm on “faceless” plaintiffs, 294 courts may run into trouble when dealing with jurisdictional issues.
This is because it would be a stretch to say that a defendant “purposely
availed” herself to a state’s jurisdiction or “expressly aimed” her actions at
a particular plaintiff in a given state when the tortfeasor was ex ante blind to
the victim of her tort. 295 Even state long-arm statutes that provide for jurisdiction over foreign defendants may not be tailored to account for cloud
torts performed on data that is located at a remote server. 296

291. See supra Part IV.A.1.
292. See supra Part IV.A.2.
293. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891) (“[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all
injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (“The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither known nor
should be known to the actor makes the injury greater than that which the actor as a reasonable
man should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct.”).
294. As in the hypothetical above, where a data thief could have used a random-number generator or computer algorithm to obtain X’s credit-card information and had no knowledge of who
X was, X is considered to be a faceless plaintiff.
295. See Jenny L. Grantz, A Culture Without Consequences? Redefining Purposeful Availment
for Wrongful Online Conduct, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1146 (2012) (noting that “most courts will
not exercise jurisdiction unless the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s geographical location”).
296. For example, New York’s long-arm statute provides for:
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A solution to the conflict between logical locations for bringing suit
and the constitutional barriers to doing so is for courts to adopt a caveat maleficus approach. Under this theory, jurisdiction would automatically—and
only as a balancing mechanism—be proper in the plaintiff’s place of residence. While this proposal might appear rigid and overly plaintiff-friendly,
the very nature of torts in the cloud warrants its perceived harshness to defendants. Cloud torts that involve the hacking of remote servers to obtain
information are complex and sophisticated.297 In other words, there are
high intellectual barriers to entry for the illicit activities that occur in the
cloud, and tortfeasors know and understand, technologically, what it is that
they are doing when they access a server. Suffice to say, this sort of cloud
tort is a very intentional tort (at least in suits not against a provider, for example in a lawsuit for negligent server security).
Accordingly, when a cloud tortfeasor implements a computer algorithm or runs a random number generator to obtain the credit-card information or social security number of a random person in a database, it
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious act
without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a
cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns, uses
or possesses any real property situated within the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (2003). We can immediately eliminate the “transacts any business” and
“owns, uses, or possesses any real property” options. We can also comfortably eliminate the
“commits a tortious act within the state” option. The tort (in the hypothetical) occurs at the remote
server where person X’s information is actually stolen. Cf. Michael E. O’Neill, Old Crimes in
New Bottles, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 245 (2000) (“The computer as the subject of a crime
means that the computer is ‘the physical site of the crime, or the source of, or reason for, unique
forms of asset loss.’” (quoting Laura J. Nicholson et al., Comment, Computer Crimes, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 207, 211 (2000))). Query how privacy could be invaded in a jurisdiction where the
tortfeasor never enters—physically or otherwise—that jurisdiction. Arguably, however, the data
thief virtually “enters” the remote cloud server at its location in the Caribbean Sea. That leaves us
then with “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the
state.” The stolen property (the money from X’s bank account) is not “in” New York, however—
it is in either North Carolina or Delaware, where the bank is located. The question before us, then,
becomes whether the injury to X is commensurate with her residence, or with her person. In other
words, if X were on vacation in Virginia when the data thief hacked into the server and obtained
her credit card information, would the tort then effectively occur in Virginia, as opposed to New
York? Certainly, X did not travel to Virginia and leave her privacy right behind in New York.
297. Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1075 (2001)
(noting that “[c]ybercrime is . . . somewhat different from regular crime in that it initially requires
sophistication and expertise”).
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should come as no surprise to the tortfeasor that her victim is located in
what would appear to be a random jurisdiction, that is, not the tortfeasor’s
own state of residence. To be sure, the very nature of the tort and level of
sophistication required to commit it compels a quasi quid pro quo—where a
tortfeasor indiscriminately targets a victim, justice requires the tortfeasor to
defend a lawsuit in the victim’s equally “indiscriminate” home state.
The caveat maleficus approach thus serves a three-fold purpose. First,
it may deter defendants from committing a cloud tort if they know that they
will have to “take their plaintiff where they find him.” 298 Second, and as a
corollary, it effectively eliminates a defendant’s constitutional argument
that she did not aim her actions at a given jurisdiction. In other words, the
“faceless” plaintiff is a double-edged sword for defendants—a defendant’s
lack of knowledge about her plaintiff, it could be argued, imparts upon the
defendant the awareness that she could be haled into court anywhere, and in
essence aims her actions everywhere.299 Finally, the caveat maleficus approach serves the benefit of giving end users a greater proclivity to interact
with software and programs in the cloud knowing that they have recourse
for violations of their cloud privacy through their own local consumerprotection laws, as opposed to those laws of a foreign jurisdiction (whether
national or international).300
2. The Cloud as Its Own Jurisdiction
A second possible solution for resolving the cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdiction is to simply rise above the world below and
create a new jurisdiction for torts and crimes that occur in the cloud. That
is, we could consider the cloud as a separate and distinct jurisdiction of its
own, free of physical geographic boundaries. This structure might take a

298. See Daniel W. Shuman, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 118–32 (1993) (advocating for deterrence as a goal of tort law); see also generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (same).
299. See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(“Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of UBE to Verizon’s e-mail servers.
They cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by simply pleading ignorance as to where
these se[r]vers were physically located.”); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d
818, 834 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (“[Defendant] cannot plead lack of purposeful availment because the ‘nature’ of the Internet does not allow it to know the geographic location of its email
recipients.”); see also Grantz, supra note 295, at 1152–56 (discussing cases where the defendant
was unaware of the plaintiff’s location but was nevertheless subject to jurisdiction).
300. Cf. Geist, supra note 255, at 1347 (“Consumers anxious to purchase online must also balance the promise of unlimited choice, greater access to information, and a more competitive global marketplace with the fact that they may not benefit from the security normally afforded by local
consumer protection laws.”).
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form analogous to that of the Court of Federal Claims, which is the exclusive court for, inter alia, patent-infringement lawsuits against the government, and similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is
the exclusive jurisdiction for all patent-related appeals. 301 Indeed, a similar
scheme for handling disputes regarding the Internet was previously advocated by David Johnson, Co-Director of the Cyberspace Law Institute, and
Professor David Post. 302
In their 1996 article discussing law in cyberspace, Johnson and Post
argue that “[t]reating Cyberspace as a separate ‘space’ to which distinct
laws apply should come naturally, . . . [because] the line that separates
online transactions from our dealings in the real world is just as distinct as
the physical boundaries between our territorial governments.” 303 Additionally, because the Internet is accessible globally, Johnson and Post urge that
“[c]onceiving of the Net as a separate place for purposes of legal analysis
will have great simplifying effects.” 304 Moreover, a special jurisdiction for
the Internet would put an end to local jurisdictions engaging in what the authors refer to as an “illegitimate extra-territorial power grab.” 305
There is, perhaps, an even stronger argument that this proposal should
gain traction for cloud computing more so than it has for the Internet.306
That is because unlike Internet torts, cloud torts do not necessarily have a
nexus to any physical location (even if cloud servers do). Whether a court
is addressing a defamation or trademark infringement claim, for example,
Internet causes of action stem from effects that are felt in one or multiple
geographic jurisdictions. The Internet is thus merely a medium through
which a tort is committed. 307 The cloud, on the other hand, is a “location”
itself where a tort is committed.308 For example, copyrighted information
301. As to the Court of Federal Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); as to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
302. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
303. Id. at 1379.
304. Id. at 1380.
305. Id. at 1380.
306. See Rollo, supra note 155, at 693 (noting that “[t]o date, no court has adopted the Cyberspace approach to the Internet.”).
307. See Johnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1378 (“Traditional legal doctrine treats the Net as
a mere transmission medium that facilitates the exchange of messages sent from one legally significant geographical location to another, each of which has its own applicable laws.”).
308. See Couillard, supra note 84, at 2237–38 (“[T]he [cloud] service provider has a copy of
the keys to a user’s cloud ‘storage unit,’ much like a landlord or storage locker owner has keys to
a tenant’s space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal carrier has the keys to a
mailbox.”).
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can be accessed and replicated in the cloud, and the infringement occurs regardless of whether the copyright owner in a specific geographic jurisdiction recognizes the infringement.
Accordingly, in much the same way that the complexities of patents
gave birth to a specialized appeals court, 309 a similar scheme may be the answer to the complex jurisdictional fact patterns presented in cloud disputes.
This scheme might also provide the benefits of eliminating forum shopping
by plaintiffs as well as eliminating altogether defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3. Legislative Action and a Regulatory Scheme
Finally, updating current, or drafting entirely new, federal legislation
may provide at least a partial answer to the jurisdictional conundrum. The
Stored Communication Act (“SCA”), 310 for example, is the principal piece
of legislation dealing with online privacy protections. 311 As commentators
have noted, however, “[w]hen Congress enacted this legislation in 1986, it
likely never contemplated anything akin to modern cloud computing,” 312
and Congress “has not amended [the SCA] to address cloud computing.” 313
It is, therefore, time for comprehensive federal legislation that may solve
the issue of where jurisdiction is proper in the cloud.
The legislation that we propose would not itself designate the forum
for bringing a lawsuit. Rather, these new laws should better define the
types of crimes and torts being committed in the cloud so as to nudge a
plaintiff toward a particular forum. Because questions regarding the actual
location of a wrongful act tend to arise when dealing with complex cloud

309. See Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent Jurisprudence in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 839, 840–41 (2011) (noting
the problems among regional circuit courts and at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that
spurred Congress to create the Federal Circuit).
310. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11
(2006)).
311. Robison, supra note 5, at 1196; see also Nathaniel Gleicher, Neither a Customer Nor a
Subscriber Be: Regulating the Release of User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE
L.J. 1945, 1945 (2009) (“Without the SCA to balance the interests of users, law enforcement, and
private industry, communications will be subjected to a tug-of-war between the private companies
that transmit them and the government agencies that seek to access them. Internet users will find
themselves with little protection.”)
312. Dystra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 11.
313. Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 617, 645 (2011).
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torts, 314 a regulatory scheme tailored specifically to cloud computing would
provide courts with clarity and guidance on what tort is being committed—
or in the case of a lawsuit by a consumer against a service provider, a contract breach—and thus, where the tort (or breach) is being committed. Accordingly, rather than relying on generic claims such as “invasion of privacy” or “infringement,” courts would be provided with a framework for dedetermining where the wrongful acts occurred based on the plain text of
statutes.
Similar legislative overhauls can be seen in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 315 and the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), 316 which were enacted in response to changes in technology. 317
Both contain provisions that recognize the need for a balanced approach
that provides certainty to stakeholders. For example, “safe harbor” provisions that protect service providers appear in both the DMCA 318 and
CDA. 319 Congress could similarly revise the SCA, or draft entirely new
comprehensive legislation, to provide increased uniformity for establishing
personal jurisdiction in the cloud. This latter option would, however—like
any attempt to create a legislative magic bullet in the context of fast-moving
and far-ranging innovation—likely be fraught with difficulties. By way of
analogy, the DMCA as a whole has been roundly criticized by copyright
scholars, yet its safe-harbor provision has been largely heralded as a success. 320 Thus, it would appear, at least at this early stage, that a more selective, targeted approach is warranted.

314. See supra note 296 (discussing New York’s long-arm statute and the questionable jurisdiction in New York).
315. Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512,
1201–05, 1301–32; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)).
316. Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230,
560–61 (2006)).
317. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (2006) (“The rapidly developing array of Internet and other
interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.”); id. §(b)(1)
(“It is the policy of the United States to promote the continued development of the Internet . . . .”);
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
673, 680–81 (2000) (“The millennial hope underlying the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [was]
to bring U.S. copyright law ‘squarely into the digital age.’” (internal footnotes omitted)).
318. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
319. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
320. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 333 (2013) (“‘[S]afe harbors’ [] have shielded intermediaries from
secondary liability and thereby removed potential governmental and private constraints on the development of new Internet services.”).
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V. CHOICE OF LAW IN THE CLOUD
Litigation arising out of the cloud will frequently present multijurisdictional fact patterns. Workload migration 321 and redundancy, 322 as well as
location independence, tend to increase the geographic scope of cloudbased interactions. 323 Consequently, such litigation will often raise complex choice-of-law questions. 324
En route to identifying a set of analytical guidelines for choice of law
in the cloud, we turn first to an examination of Internet choice-of-law jurisprudence. Though the Internet and cloud computing are imperfect analogs,
the two do present some similarities. As with cloud-computing interactions, Internet-based interactions can involve some sense of “location independence” and a broad-ranging geographic sphere of influence. 325 “Indeed,
the Internet ‘negates geometry . . . it is fundamentally and profoundly antispatial.’” 326 Like cloud computing, the development and adoption of the
Internet (1) introduced an element of intangibility into human interactions
and (2) represents a technological paradigm shift that both informs, and is
informed by, globalization and the accompanying increase in cosmopolitanism. The similarities between the two allow lessons for the cloud to be
gleaned from an analysis of how choice-of-law principles have evolved (or
failed to evolve) to account for the advent of the Internet.
A. Lessons from Internet Choice-of-Law Jurisprudence
A debate currently persists among legal scholars as to whether the
choice-of-law approaches outlined above 327 are sufficiently robust to allow

321. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64.
322. See Timothy J. Calloway, Note, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation on Liability Causes: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 170 n.41 (2012)
(“Most Cloud services maintain data in up to three separate locations. This is an excellent redundancy, should there be an [I]nternet outage or data center disaster. The data is readily available
from the other Cloud locations without an interruption in service.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
323. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Alberto G. Araiza, Note, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 8, at *12 (“For example, the data in data centers may be subject to foreign laws or no
laws at all.”).
325. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59.
326. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
327. See supra Parts III.B.1–3.
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adjudication of cases involving Internet-based interactions. 328 On the one
hand, the Internet clearly represents a dramatic shift in the way humans interact with one another,329 and the contacts relevant to the choice-of-law
analyses that predated the Internet can be much more geographically complex than those presented by real-world interactions. 330 What is more, some
scholars have pointed out that the territorial-based conception of states and
nation–states may be quickly becoming archaic in an increasingly connected world, 331 calling into question the validity of choice-of-law methodologies that were developed in the Pre-Network Era. 332 Some have gone so far
as to posit that “[n]o physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than
any other to subject [Internet-based] events exclusively to its laws.” 333
Even in the face of these difficulties, however, “U.S. courts have . . .
applied standard choice-of-law methodology—the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, Governmental Interest Analysis, and the like—in
[I]nternet disputes involving multiple states of the United States and foreign
countries.” 334 Remaining is the question of how they have done so—that is,
the extent to and manner in which courts have applied those standard methodologies in the context of the Internet. The following Subparts explore
three archetypal choice-of-law decisions involving Internet contacts.
1. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com335
The GlobalSantaFe Corp. litigation involved a relatively “straightforward” set of facts (at least for an international conflict-of-laws case). 336

328. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Internet Choice-of-Law Governance, Temple University Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2012-20, at 4 (June 7, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045070 (“The decision not to lead choiceof-law students through a separate study of internet issues reflects the decision that existing legal
paradigms are sufficient to handle internet conflicts issues. This is not, however, the exclusive
position among U.S. choice-of-law scholars.”).
329. See supra Part II.B.
330. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 226, at 320 (“Indeed, even a cursory examination reveals
that our current territorially based rules for jurisdiction (and conflict of laws) were developed in an
era when physical geography was more meaningful than it is today and during a brief historical
moment when the ideas of nation and state were being joined by a hyphen to create an historically
contingent Westphalian order.”).
332. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2005) (applying a
“cosmopolitan pluralist” approach to Internet-based choice-of-law issues).
333. Johnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1376.
334. Little, supra note 328, at 4.
335. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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Two offshore drilling firms, Global Marine and Santa Fe, announced in
September 2001 that they intended to merge into the GlobalSantaFe Corporation. 337 Within twenty-four hours, Jongsun Ha Park, a Korean citizen,
used a Korean registrar to register the Internet domain name “globalsantafe.com.” 338 Park did not immediately post any substantive content to
the globalsantafe.com website, a fact that—when coupled with the suspicious timing of the domain name registration—seemed to indicate that he
intended to engage in “cybersquatting,” 339 a potential violation of U.S.
law. 340 Despite a final judgment from a U.S. district court ordering the Korean registrar to transfer the domain name to GlobalSantaFe, Park next obtained a provisional injunction in a Korean court prohibiting the registrar
from doing so on the theory that the U.S. district court lacked jurisdiction
over the Korean registrar. 341 As a result, GlobalSantaFe requested and obtained a second judgment from the U.S. district court that again directed the
transfer of the domain name. 342
The Globalsantafe Corp. opinions addressed questions of jurisdiction
and recognition of judgments rather than pure choice of law. Viewed
through those lenses, the U.S. court’s decisions were fairly straightforward
applications of existing law—that is, of the law of the United States. Having decided that jurisdiction lay in the Eastern District of Virginia, and that
the U.S. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) 343 forbade
the Korean parties’ actions, all that remained in the court’s view was to ensure that comity concerns did not require deference to the Korean court’s
order. 344 Put simply, the U.S. court skipped from the question of whether it
336. Id. at 612.
337. Id. at 612–13.
338. Id. Park then transferred ownership of the domain name to the Fanmore Corporation, a
Korean firm. Id. at 613.
339. See Gatsik, supra note 240.
340. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
341. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
342. GlobalSantaFe also successfully directed VeriSign (the top-level domain name registry)
to cancel the domain name until the Korean registrar transferred it to GlobalSantaFe. See id. at
614, 626–27.
343. Pub. L. No. 106–113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–545 (1999) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8131).
344. See GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (“In addition to meeting these jurisdictional requirements, GlobalSantaFe must also show . . . that it is entitled to relief under the
ACPA, . . . and . . . that concerns of international comity do not preclude such a remedy in the face
of the Korean court’s injunction.”). The U.S. court, applying U.S. law, held that the “first-intime” rule, along with the fact that the “Korean proceeding was obviously begun with the intent of
blocking the Judgment Order,” did not require deference to comity concerns. Id. at 624–25 (citing
Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1939)).
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could hear the case to the question of whether the ACPA had been violated.
The choice-of-law question, that is, the question of whether the ACPA
ought to be the law that governed the parties’ actions, was simply ignored.
2. Mzamane v. Winfrey 345
By her own estimation, in 2007, Oprah Winfrey was the third most
powerful media figure in the world (behind only Barack and Michelle
Obama). 346 Yet such power can be a double-edged sword. The sphere of
Oprah Winfrey’s influence, coupled with the globalized nature of Internet
communications, led to a defamation suit being filed against her in connection with alleged sexual abuses at a South African school that she founded. 347 When scandal erupted at the Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for
Girls (“Winfrey Academy”) in September 2007, Winfrey swiftly placed the
headmistress of the school, Lerato Nomvuyo Mzamane, on administrative
leave. 348 Several of Winfrey’s subsequent statements to the press regarding
the situation—which were ultimately disseminated globally via the Internet 349—spurred Ms. Mzamane to sue Winfrey in Pennsylvania state
court. 350
Mzamane v. Winfrey yielded a broad swath of geographic contacts.
The plaintiff, Mzamane, was born in Lesotho, matriculated in Nigeria,
Vermont, and New York, and had been employed in Pennsylvania for the
six years that preceded her one-year stint at the Winfrey Academy in South
Africa. 351 The defendant, Winfrey, was at all times domiciled in Illinois,
and her allegedly defamatory statements were made in that state.352 Finally,
as they had been published online, Winfrey’s public declarations reached
nearly everywhere, including South Africa (the locus of the scandal that
prompted the statements).353
345. 693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
346. Eamon McNiff, Judge Rules Oprah Winfrey Can Be Sued for Defamation, ABC NEWS,
Mar. 18, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/oprah-sued-defamation/
story?id=10127882.
347. See Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 464–65.
348. Id. at 464.
349. See id. at 471 (“Defendants concede, however, that the statements from the November
Press Conference were available on the internet, and therefore, were published throughout the
United States, including Pennsylvania.”).
350. See id. at 466. Winfrey subsequently removed the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship of the parties. Id.
351. Id. at 461–62.
352. Id. at 462.
353. Id. at 462, 471.
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On these facts, the case presented a fairly knotty choice-of-law issue.
After Winfrey removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the court was bound to apply the choice-of-law methodology of Pennsylvania (the state in which the court was located), which had adopted the
Second Restatement approach. 354 The three most connected jurisdictions
were Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Africa. And while it is perhaps unsurprising that South African law may have yielded a different outcome
than U.S. law, 355 even the choice between Illinois and Pennsylvania laws
could have been outcome-determinative. 356 Oddly, however, given its
plaintiff-friendly nature, “neither party raised the applicability of South African law to Plaintiff’s claims. Rather, both parties argued vigorously
against the application of South African law to the instant dispute.” 357
An easy alternative had thus presented itself to the U.S. district court:
ignore the possibility that South African law ought to apply, given that neither party had argued in favor of its application. What is more, the court
was under no duty to inquire, sua sponte, as to such a possibility. 358 After
concluding that Pennsylvania (the state of Mzamane’s domicile) had a
stronger interest than Illinois in having its law apply to the case, however,
the court went on to examine in some detail the question of whether South
Africa’s interest in protecting Mzamane’s reputation militated in favor of
South African law applying. 359 And though the court ultimately concluded
that Pennsylvania’s law ought to apply, its decision was clear, its rationale
transparent, and its result relatively predictable.

354. Id. at 469–71.
355. Id. at 473 (finding that a true conflict existed where South African law required defendants to prove truth as a defense to a defamation claim, while Pennsylvania law required plaintiffs
in such cases to prove falsity as part of their affirmative case).
356. See Neil M. Rosenbaum, Pick a Court, Any Court: Forum Shopping Defamation Claims
in the Internet Age, 14 J. INTERNET L. 18, 21 (2011) (“Illinois recognizes the ‘innocent construction rule’ as a complete defense to claims for defamation per se whereas Pennsylvania does not.”).
357. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
358. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s
law must give notice by a pleading or other writing.”); Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 468–69
(“While this rule empowers a district court with the authority to determine applicable foreign law,
it imposes no obligation on the court to inquire into foreign law sua sponte.” (citing Bel-Ray Co.
v. Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1999))).
359. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 473–75 (examining the content of South African defamation law and the interests, as elucidated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, that it sought
to further).
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3. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton 360
The Internet domain name “rl.com,” registered in 1995 by Dale Mayberry, proved valuable enough to incite multiple lawsuits, including one
brought by global clothing giant Ralph Lauren. Mayberry, a Virginia resident, registered the name under a contract with a Delaware registrar whose
principal place of business was also in Virginia. 361 Mayberry periodically
renewed the domain-name registration, though there was some dispute as to
whether he subsequently “abandoned” the registration by letting it expire.362
In December 2003, a Beijing resident named Li Qiang gained control
of rl.com and transferred it to Barnali Kalita, a citizen of India. 363 Subsequently, Kalita sold the name to John Laxton, a citizen of California.364
Upon discovering that Laxton controlled rl.com, Mayberry filed a lawsuit in
a federal district court in California, alleging conversion, interference with
contracts, and unfair competition. 365
The district court, having decided that the primary issue was one of
choice of law and that California law ought to apply, granted summary
judgment in favor of Mayberry on his conversion claims and ordered Laxton to turn over rl.com to Mayberry. 366 Laxton appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 367 On appeal, the primary issue was again choice of law—Laxton (the
California defendant) contended that Virginia law ought to apply, while
Mayberry (the Virginia plaintiff) argued in favor of California law. 368
As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[t]his case requires application of traditional choice-of-law . . . principles to an increasingly common factual setting, a dispute over the ownership of an Internet domain name.” 369 California had “specifically rejected” the First Restatement approach in favor of
“‘governmental-interest’ analysis,” with the “comparative impairment”

360. 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010).
361. Id. at 1140.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1140–41.
364. Id. at 1141.
365. See CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, No. C 06-7093 CW, 2008 WL 4427944, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.
2010).
366. Id. at *8.
367. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1139–40.
368. Id. at 1141.
369. Id. at 1139.

374

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:313

method used to adjudicate true conflicts.370 Yet California also incorporated a strain of the lex fori methodology—the court emphasized that “[a]s a
default, the law of the forum state will be invoked, and the burden is with
the proponent of foreign law to show that the foreign rule of decision will
further the interests of that state.” 371
The first question to be resolved in governmental-interest analysis—
whether the potentially applicable laws actually differ 372—posed some difficulty. “Like the majority of states to have addressed the issue, California
law recognize[d] a property interest in domain names,” 373 which meant that
domain names could be subject to conversion under California law. The
Virginia Supreme Court, on the other hand, had held—albeit in the context
of a garnishment case—that domain names comprise contract (not property)
rights. 374 Despite this, the Ninth Circuit found that no conflict existed, resting its reasoning on two grounds. First, given the “majority of states’ justifiable coalescence” around the property-rights rule, the court found it reasonable to adopt a “narrow” reading of the Virginia Supreme Court
decision. 375 And second, the fact that California treated domain names differently than other intangible property for purposes of judgment debtor examinations allowed the “reasonable” inference that Virginia “might” do the
same. 376 California’s “default-to-forum” rule thus dictated that California
law ought to apply. 377
Despite this holding, however, the court went on to address the second
step of interest analysis: whether (assuming a conflict exists), the conflict is
“true” or “false,” a conflict being false where only one jurisdiction has any
real interest in having its laws apply to the facts at hand. 378 Here, the court
characterized the Virginia interest as follows: “Virginia is concerned with

370. Id. at 1141–42. The comparative-impairment solution to Currie’s “true conflicts” problem was developed by Professor William Baxter in the 1960s. See Baxter, supra note 182, at 8–9.
371. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666,
670 (Cal. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
372. Id. (citing Abogados v. AT & T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000)).
373. Id. at 1142.
374. See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 88 (Va. 2000) (finding
that, in the context of a garnishment case, domain names are governed by contract law).
375. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143.
376. Id.
377. See id. (“Under California choice-of-law rules, the party seeking application of foreign
law bears the burden to show that the law of a foreign state should apply. At the point Laxton
fails to make this showing, we default to forum (California) law.” (internal citation omitted)).
378. See supra Part III.B.2; see also Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 253–55 (1958) (referring to “false problems”).
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protecting Virginia residents who purchase domain names from property
claims, not from asserting property claims.” 379 California’s interests, on the
other hand, were painted with broad strokes—“to protect the intangible
property rights of the owners of domain names,” 380 to reduce uncertainty
and encourage investment, and to “promot[e] the overall growth of the Internet.” 381 In sum, the Ninth Circuit found that “California’s policy . . . is
thus accurately characterized as protecting the rightful holders of domain
names, [and] encouraging investment in and development of that property.” 382 What is more, the court reasoned, “when the defendant is a resident
of California and the tortious conduct . . . occurs [in California], California’s deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly advanced by application of its own law.” 383
Finally, the court concluded its choice-of-law analysis on an emphatic
note:
Holding otherwise would encourage a race to the bottom, allowing purchasers of potentially disputed domain names, as well
as cybersquatters, to reside or operate in states where intangible
property is provided little or no protection from potentially tortious conversion. Such a situation could vitiate the intangible
property rights of the true holders of such property notwithstanding states’ well-intentioned efforts to protect these intellectual property interests.384
By delving into the qualitative “value” of the two jurisdictions’ laws, this
parade-of-horribles argument employed a methodology akin to the “better
law” approach urged by Professor Leflar. 385
On four counts, the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion demonstrates a localminded train of choice-of-law methodology and analysis referred to as “parochialism.” 386 First, as a structural matter, the lex fori strain contained

379. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143.
380. Id. at 1144.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666, 672 (Cal. 1974) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
384. Id.
385. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
386. Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 370
(2001). Emphasizing the problem of parochialism, Professor Reimann noted that parochialism
was “amply confirmed by the Second Restatement[,] which all but ignores comparative and international elements.” Id. at 380.
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within California’s choice-of-law rules 387 displays an obvious geographic
self-favoritism. Of course, bound as it was to apply California’s chosen approach, the court can hardly be blamed for operating within such a structure. Yet the structure itself appears increasingly outmoded in an era of
globalization and digital connectivity, and (as we argue infra) its shortcomings will be exacerbated should it creep into the cloud.388
Second, the decision evidenced the opposite of the cultural relativism
more appropriate to an increasingly cosmopolitan world and the multistate
and multinational fact patterns that have already begun to emerge in cloudbased litigation. By presuming to determine the content of foreign laws by
reasoning that the foreign jurisdiction would likely treat legal issues as the
forum jurisdiction had done, the CRS Recovery, Inc. court committed the
error of judging another culture from within the confines of one’s own local
tradition. Granted, the probability of “Type II” error 389 from doing so was
likely relatively low where the two jurisdictions were both U.S. states. But
where the foreign jurisdiction is a foreign nation, and particularly a nonWestern nation, the likelihood of such error would likely increase.
Third, in characterizing the relevant state interests as it did, the court
engaged in a parochialist sleight-of-hand. By defining the foreign jurisdiction’s interests at a low level of abstraction—and assuming the sole purpose
of Virginia’s treating domain name rights as contract rights was to guard its
own citizens against property claims—the court essentially minimized the
scope of relevant foreign interests. And that, in turn, had the effect of favoring the application of local (forum) law. Tellingly, the court also observed that California’s full-compensation rule would be furthered where
the defendant was a California resident.390 Thus, it reasoned that the forum
jurisdiction had an interest in compensating nonlocal plaintiffs—yet the
court had already characterized Virginia’s interest as protecting only Virginia (i.e., local) residents. 391 Ascribing a nonlocalized interest to the forum state, but a merely local interest to the foreign state, had the perverse
consequence of further favoring local law.

387. See supra Part III.B.3.
388. See infra Part V.A.2.
389. A “Type II error” consists of failing to reject a false null hypothesis. In this context, the
court’s null hypothesis was that foreign law was structured similarly to local law; thus, a Type II
error would arise if the foreign law was in fact structured differently from local law, but the court
proceeded as if the two were the same.
390. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010).
391. Id. at 1143–44.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s parade-of-horribles argument, though
based on a putatively qualitative analysis of the conflicting laws, exhibited
a logical and parochialist fallacy. The argument centered on the potentiality
of cybersquatters locating themselves “in states where intangible property is
provided little or no protection from potentially tortious conversion.” 392
Assuming that domain names constitute “intangible property,” however,
begged the question by assuming away the unsettled inquiry at the very
heart of the choice-of-law dispute—namely, whether domain names comprise property rights or contract rights. The argument is circular. And the
circularity arose when the court implicitly (and parochially) assumed that
California (local) law governed in the first instance. Again, the effect of
addressing the choice-of-law issue from within a framework that took for
granted the applicability (and superiority) of local law was—
unsurprisingly—to favor local law and interests over those of the foreign
jurisdiction.
4. Conclusions
The preceding sections suggest that Internet choice-of-law jurisprudence has developed in scattershot fashion. Methodologies, application,
and the scope and breadth of analyses have varied widely. The three cases
discussed above construct a spectrum—from GlobalSantaFe, with its glaring lack of analysis; to Mzamane, a relatively well-reasoned and balanced
opinion; to CRS Recovery, Inc., with its various shades of parochialism and
xenophobia.
Unfortunately, to the extent scholars have identified any broader trends
within this sphere, the tendency appears to be toward either simply ignoring
choice-of-law questions or engaging in (at best) superficial inquiries. 393
The portrait drawn is one of a “curious tendency in [I]nternet cases: even
though the disputes invariably possess significant multi-jurisdictional elements, courts often do not bother with traditional choice-of-law analysis.” 394 Put simply, courts have tended to ask only whether local law may

392. Id. at 1144.
393. See e.g., Berman, supra note 332, at 1823 (“[S]imply because U.S. law may apply, the
judges seem to assume that U.S. law should apply, even without any sustained discussion of other
possible outcomes. At most, there is some consideration of comity.”); Andrea Slane, Tales,
Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the Legal Construction of
Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 129, 130 (2008) (“[C]ourts in Internet cases almost always confine conflicts issues to the exercise of . . . personal jurisdiction . . .
[and] virtually never engage in a full conflicts analysis”).
394. Little, supra note 328, at 7.
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apply, not whether it should apply. 395 This is the approach exemplified by
GlobalSantaFe, on the far end of—or, arguably, even off—the choice-oflaw spectrum. 396
Even when courts have engaged in more extended discussions of
choice-of-law questions in the online context, they often display surprisingly “regressive” attitudes. 397 As the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion amply
demonstrates, opportunities to favor local interests over foreign ones
abound within modern choice-of-law methodologies. And this is true even
within analytical structures that do not overtly tilt in favor of local interests;
the lex fori approach (and its lesser strains that surface in, for example, California’s nominally interest-analysis based system 398) is more obviously parochial.
All of this is still more surprising—and disturbing—given the context
in which this jurisprudence is occurring. The Internet has itself been a disruptive technology, allowing instantaneous bridging between geographic
areas once considered so remote as to be almost entirely unconnected. 399
What is more, both exogenously and endogenously to the rise of the Internet, the world has become an increasingly globalized, cosmopolitan
place. 400 These developments require contemporary institutions and individuals to confront a thorny, and somewhat paradoxical, question: How can
political, social, legal, and economic cross-border integration be accomplished while also respecting myriad unique cultural structures and identities? 401
There may well be no single, overarching answer to this question, and
it is certainly not our aim to attempt to provide one here—not even one that
could be compressed to fit the relatively narrow contours of choice of law
in the cloud. At a bare minimum, it should provoke little or no disagreement to declare that the parochial approaches and artifices described above
represent an inappropriately narrow-minded solution. Beyond that, the
395. Id.
396. See supra Part V.A.1.
397. See Little, supra note 328, at 7 (observing that “unilateral analysis continues to have a
remarkably strong presence in choice-of-law cases”).
398. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010); see also supra Part III.B.3
(discussing lex fori).
399. See supra Part II.B.
400. For one of the most prominent discussions of contemporary globalization, see THOMAS
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999).
401. Identifying this struggle could be said to be the central thesis of Friedman’s work. See,
e.g., id. at 327–64 (describing the “backlash” against and the “groundswell” in favor of globalization).
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normative goals identified in Part III.C can serve as touchstones. Thus,
with reference to furthering those aims (and avoiding the repetition of past
mistakes), we ultimately seek to identify not a single “magic bullet,” but rather parameters to help steer future choice-of-law analyses.
B. Analytical Guidelines for Choice of Law in the Cloud
By applying the lessons to be learned from over a decade of Internetbased choice-of-law jurisprudence to the analogous cloud computing context, this Subpart provides a set of guideposts to inform future jurisprudence
and scholarship. Again, these comprise no panacea. Presently unforeseeable problems will undoubtedly arise as the digital world shifts increasingly
into the cloud. The principles encompassed in the following discussion,
however, may ease the transition and allow the course of the law to avoid
repeating the mistakes of the past.
1. Confronting Conflicts: The Pitfalls of the “Jurisdiction-Only”
Solution
None of the normative goals identified in Part III.C can be served by
simply ignoring choice-of-law questions. Yet, as seen in the Internet context, courts confronted with complex, novel issues appear frequently to do
just that. 402 If the choice-of-law inquiry holds any value at all—and nearly
two centuries of jurisprudence, civil law, and scholarship suggest that it
does—then courts considering choice of law in litigation arising out of the
cloud ought not follow this route, tempting though it may be. Simply asking whether local law can apply is not enough, particularly given the increasingly national and international nature of cloud computing. Courts
must “confront, instead of gloss[ing] over, the apparent conflict in values
and acknowledge that a choice must be made and justified.”403
What we refer to as the “jurisdiction-only” approach may be “predictable” in the sense that, once a complaint has been filed, parties are able to
predict which law will apply ex post to their interactions (at least in cases
where jurisdiction lies in the plaintiff’s chosen forum). But it is not predictable in the ex ante sense, i.e., private parties cannot ex ante predict what
set of laws will likely apply to their actions—and it is this latter sense of
predictability that produces the efficiencies sought by modern choice-of-law
rules. Furthermore, this jurisdiction-only style of choice-of-law methodol402. Cf. generally GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.Com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D.
Va. 2003); see also supra Part V.A.1.
403. Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as Fact and Aid
to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 913 (2010).
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ogy—or, perhaps more accurately, lack of methodology—is clearly neither
an open nor transparent mode of analysis. And finally, it lacks objectivity,
for it unduly favors plaintiffs by essentially allowing them to choose which
(presumably plaintiff-friendly) law ought to apply by engaging in forum
shopping. To the extent that plaintiffs tend to file lawsuits in their local jurisdiction, this approach also functions in an unnecessarily parochial manner.
By reducing trust, signaling a xenophobic mindset, and increasing uncertainty, each of these facets of the jurisdiction-only approach fail to further—and actually undermine—the prosocial adoption of innovative cloudcomputing processes. Again, courts in this context should not ask only
whether forum law may apply, but should go on to ask whether local law
ought to apply, keeping the traditional aims of choice-of-law rules—as well
as the unique goals noted above—firmly in mind.
2. Leaving Lex Fori Behind
Like the jurisdiction-only approach, the lex fori methodology is particularly unsuited to resolving cloud-based choice-of-law questions while also
serving normative ends. It is, to be sure, simple to apply—a feature that
may explain its continued, albeit limited, use. 404 Functionally, however, it
is indistinguishable from a jurisdiction-only system: courts first analyze the
question of jurisdiction, then simply apply local law. It could be argued
that lex fori does possess one advantage over the jurisdiction-only approach
in that it is quite transparent, that is, lex fori courts openly favor local law
over foreign law. The expressive function of law, however—the reality that
law affects social interactions not only by what it does, but by what it
“says” 405—causes this “advantage” to cut both ways. By openly declaring
parochial values, lex fori communicates a narrow-minded worldview even
more effectively than jurisdiction-only decisions. As a result, it may have
the ironic effect of disadvantaging local institutions and individuals by discouraging cross-border transactions and interactions that would benefit
both, or all, parties involved, including local ones. And aside from the
transparency question, lex fori is deficient in the cloud context for the same
reasons as the jurisdiction-only methodology.

404. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the lex fori approach).
405. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (“At the most general level, expressive theories tell actors—whether individuals, associations, or the State—to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.”); see also Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000).
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3. Cultural Relativism and the Content of Foreign Law
Courts using one of the more process-based choice-of-law approaches—governmental interest analysis and its offshoots, better law, or (to an
arguably lesser extent) the Second Restatement—necessarily engage in substantive and comparative analyses of forum law and the laws of one or more
foreign jurisdictions. When doing so in the context of cloud-based litigation, a paradigm of cultural relativism should inform their decisions.406
“Cultural relativism,” a concept that arose first in the field of anthropology, describes the concept “that civilization is not something absolute,
but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far
as our civilization goes.” 407 Facilitating trust and reducing uncertainty in
cross-border interactions requires a cultural-relativist framework, given that
“moral rules and social institutions evidence an astonishing cultural and historical variability.” 408 In light of this, courts should not be confident that
they can accurately assess the contours of foreign law by referring to the
content of local law. And as a result, should the parochial approach to deciphering foreign law described above become one used in multijurisdictional, cloud-based litigation, foreign parties will necessarily face more ex
ante uncertainty when ordering their interactions with local parties. Furthermore, by communicating that local law provides the touchstone for analyzing the content of foreign law, this attitude (like lex fori) expresses a parochial message that may ultimately hinder the spread of innovation.
Instead, courts ought to refer to foreign codes, common law, and regulations—not local law—when attempting to discern the content of foreign
law.
4. Ceteris Paribus Levels of Abstraction for Governmental Interests
Choice-of-law rules that require characterization of governmental interests, as seen above, present an opportunity for more subtle parochialism.
Thus, careful ceteris paribus abstraction should become the norm in interest-centric choice-of-law analyses. “Ceteris paribus,” a Latin phrase attributed to British economist Alfred Marshall and frequently translated as
“all other things being equal,” is often used in economics literature to describe a relationship between two variables while holding all other possibly
406. The type of cultural relativism we are referring to should be distinguished from the “radical cultural relativism” school of thought, which holds that “culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule.” Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6
HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 400, 400 (1984).
407. Franz Boas, Museums of Ethnology and Their Classification, 9 SCIENCE 587, 589 (1887).
408. Donnelly, supra note 406.
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confounding variables constant. 409 We use it here to describe the manner in
which courts ought to compare governmental interests in deciding choiceof-law issues—the two interests ought to be compared “holding all else
constant,” particularly the levels of abstraction used to define the relevant
interests. Doing so will foster transparency, predictability, objectivity, and
innovation.
The problem of defining one set of interests at a low level of abstraction while defining a more favored set of interests at a high level of abstraction is certainly not unique to the choice-of-law context. Courts have repeatedly engaged in this practice.410 In a pair of factually similar freedomof-religion cases, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the relevant
governmental interests at very different levels of abstraction—yielding an
outcome of unconstitutionality in one case and of constitutionality in the
other. 411 More recently, CRS Recovery, Inc. demonstrates the presence of
this type of outcome-determinative abstracting in Internet-based choice-oflaw disputes, as well as the possibility that it could bleed into cloud-based
litigation.
Defining foreign jurisdictions’ interests at a lower level of abstraction
than forum interests, 412 or defining forum but not foreign law as encompassing nonlocal goals, 413 is neither open nor transparent. Instead, by purporting to engage in a side-by-side, fair balancing of competing laws and
interests, yet disproportionately favoring local law, outcome-determinative
abstraction functions in a misleading, opaque manner. Furthermore, this
methodology yields outcomes that are frequently at odds with the outcome
that would be expected, given the stated choice-of-law rules. It thus hinders
predictability. Finally, placing a finger on the scale in favor of local law

409. E.g., Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
363, 364–67 (1998).
410. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 973 (1987) (“The problem for constitutional balancing is the derivation of the scale needed to
translate the value of interests into a common currency for comparison.”); Thomas C. Berg, What
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39
VILL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994) (“Many social goals appear ‘compelling’ when they are inflated to the
highest level of generality: that is, if the question is whether the law will be undermined in its application to society as a whole.”).
411. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 82–83 (1996) (comparing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
to United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
412. See, e.g., CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1443–44 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the foreign jurisdiction’s interest as a narrow interest, while discussing the forum interests
broadly).
413. E.g., id.
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both precludes objectivity and communicates parochial values. The cumulative result of these effects would be to chill the dissemination and adoption of innovative cloud processes.
5. Cosmopolitanism and Circularity in Qualitative Comparisons
In jurisdictions that overtly apply the “better law” approach (as well as
in jurisdictions wherein courts nominally apply other rules while using a
similar normative judgment as a “tiebreaker” or to buttress their conclusions), special care will be required in addressing cloud-based choice-oflaw questions. Choice of law necessarily recognizes that “[t]here is no
‘view from nowhere’ that can be used to capture the legal essence of the institution or conflict in question.” 414 Instead, courts must analyze the relevant legal structures as laterally and discretely situated, yet concurrently intertwined with the facts at hand. To avoid blatant parochialism, courts
engaging in a better-law judgment must avoid begging the question by consciously or unconsciously analyzing the qualitative merits of foreign law
from the perspective of a world in which local law already governs. 415
Here, cultural relativist—and, to some extent, feminist—critiques
again offer valuable insight: courts ought to be wary of reflexive attitudes
regarding the “other” or “immediate instincts about the cultural and legal
facts.” 416 The risk of failing to do so is especially acute where a foreign legal structure is based in part on a U.S. model, which may lull courts into a
false sense of confidence as to their understanding of the foreign law. 417
This form of question-begging yields outcomes that lack objectivity, express unseemly favoritism of local law as a result, and are unpredictable
from foreign parties’ perspective. In sum, courts adjudicating choice-oflaw issues in the cloud context would do well to adopt a more cosmopolitan
approach that recognizes the lateral nature of local and foreign laws.418

414. Karen Knop et al., From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the
Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 634 (2012).
415. This, of course, is the misstep the Ninth Circuit made in CRS Recovery, Inc. See supra
Part V.A.3.
416. Knop et al., supra note 414, at 634.
417. Maureen B. Callahan, Cultural Relativism and the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts,
30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 609 (1994).
418. Cf. Berman, supra note 332, at 1821–23 (arguing for increased cosmopolitanism in the
Internet context).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Society is well on its way toward ubiquitous deployment and adoption
of cloud computing. The legal field, however, currently lags behind these
developments. Unwieldy at best and unworkable at times, the current theories and rules governing jurisdictional and choice-of-law analyses are in
dire need of updating. While no single policy proposal could hope to serve
as a panacea for each problem courts will face in this context, a careful selection and application of the principles and reforms outlined above may
help to avoid many of the mistakes made in the earlier environment of the
Internet. Even more importantly, the selected principles will guide the continued development of jurisdiction and choice of law in the cloud so as to
promote the predictability, trust, and mutual respect that are essential to ensuring the continued spread of innovation.

